



The Texas Mess: Marital Property Characterization of Trust Income

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THE TEXAS MESS: MARITAL PROPERTY CHARACTERIZATION OF TRUST INCOME*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The last time the Texas Supreme Court considered the marital property character of income of a trust funded with a spouse’s separate property was in 1890.¹ Since then, a spouse’s rights to control and manage her own property and the income it generates has evolved, divorce has become more common, estate planning has become more sophisticated, and income tax and estate tax consequences have come to bear on this issue.² Accordingly, both the lower Texas appellate courts and the federal courts have grappled with this issue with mixed results, “creat[ing] one of the more obtuse areas of Texas law.”³ As this article discusses, the appellate courts in Fort Worth, Texarkana, and Tyler all follow one rule; the Court of Appeals in Dallas refers to a different principle; and the appellate courts in both Corpus Christi, Houston (the 14th District), and San Antonio apply yet another theory.⁴ As a matter of constitutional interpretation, this issue begs for clarification by the Texas Supreme Court.⁵

The source of this inconsistent rule application among Texas courts is the clash between two divergent sources of property law.⁶ In one corner is article XVI, section 15 of the Texas constitution, based on Spanish civil law, which defines the marital property rights of each spouse to property acquired during the marriage.⁷ In the other corner is the law of trusts, which recognizes and upholds the settlor’s property right to convey property in trust to the beneficiaries of the settlor’s choosing, provided that such conveyance does not violate public policy.⁸ All too often, courts and commentators take the position—or simply make an assumption—that one set of principles should trump the other; they form an opinion without giving much, if any, consideration to the different purposes of each of these

1. See *Martin Brown Co. v. Perrill*, 13 S.W. 975 (Tex. 1890).

2. See Oliver S. Heard Jr. et al., *Characterization of Marital Property*, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 909, 942 (1987).

3. *Id.* at 942.

4. See *infra* Part III.

5. See *infra* Part VI.

6. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.0035(b) (Thomson Reuters 2014 & Supp. 2017).

7. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.

8. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.0035(b) (Thomson Reuters 2014 & Supp. 2017).

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competing principles and without recognizing that they can possibly strike a consistent and workable balance between the two.⁹

This article begins with a historical summary of the relevant aspects of the law of marital property and trusts, and it explains certain unique features of Texas law that raise the issue addressed in this article—the characterization of a beneficiary spouse’s interest in the income of a trust funded with separate property.¹⁰ Next, Part III of this article discusses the evolution of three general approaches to such characterization under the current case law, and Part IV of this article details how different circumstances might affect this characterization under each of these approaches.¹¹ In conclusion, this article proposes two coherent and workable approaches, each of which seeks to strike a balance between these two different areas of property law.¹²

II. CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW FOUNDATIONS

A. Community Property in Texas

Texas law provides that all property owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, or acquired by a spouse during the marriage, must be either separate property or community property.¹³

A spouse’s separate property consists of: (1) the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage; (2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent; and (3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage.¹⁴

By negative definition, “[c]ommunity property consists of [all] property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage.”¹⁵ Within this definitional framework, there is a statutory presumption that “[p]roperty possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is . . . community property” unless there is clear and convincing proof to the contrary.¹⁶

9. See Heard Jr. et al., *supra* note 2, at 913–14.

10. See *infra* Part II.

11. See *infra* Parts III, IV.

12. See *infra* Part V.

13. See *Hilley v. Hilley*, 342 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tex. 1961), *superseded by constitutional amendment*, TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.

14. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (West 2006).

15. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (West 2006).

16. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003 (West 2006).

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Upon divorce, a spouse's separate property is not subject to judicial division, and when the other spouse dies, such property is not subject to intestate or probate administration; rather, "[e]ach spouse has the sole management, control, and disposition of that spouse's separate property[.]" including the right to freely gift or devise that property.¹⁷ On the other hand, upon divorce, community property is subject to just and right division by the courts, and upon the death of a spouse, one-half of any community property passes to the surviving spouse and the other half passes to the deceased spouse's devisees or heirs.¹⁸

Except with respect to the conveyance of the homestead, each spouse has the sole management, control, and disposition of the community property that the spouse would have owned if single, including: (1) personal earnings; (2) revenue from the spouse's separate property; (3) recoveries for personal injuries; and (4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, all property subject to the spouse's sole management, control, and disposition.¹⁹ Generally speaking, the spouses must act jointly with respect to all other community property.²⁰

While the laws in all nine community property states within the United States are unique, this article focuses on Texas law.²¹ That said, in a nation with such a mobile population, the unique aspects of Texas law may affect the character of marital property in a different state as quasi-community property subject to equitable division in a Texas divorce proceeding.²² Texas law may also affect the disposition of community property acquired in Texas by couples who subsequently migrate to another state.²³

17. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.101 (West 2006).

18. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (West 2006). See also *Dakan v. Dakan*, 83 S.W.2d 620, 626 (Tex. 1935). If the deceased spouse attempts to devise the entire community estate, the surviving spouse may elect to take either: (1) one-half of the community estate; or (2) as a beneficiary, according to the terms of the will. *Id.*

19. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.102(a), 5.001 (West 2006). While this category of community property is commonly referred to as "special community property," the author submits that there is nothing special about such property – in most situations, most community property acquired during the marriage will fall into this category. In this article, such property is more appropriately referred to as "sole-management community property."

20. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102(c) (West 2006) (discussing the sale, conveyance, and encumbrance of the homestead).

21. See Tony Vecino, *Boggs v. Boggs: State Community Property and Succession Rights Wallow in ERISA's Mire*, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 571, 591 (1998).

22. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.002 (West 2006).

23. See, e.g., *In re Marriage of Whelchel*, 476 N.W.2d 104, 110 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). See also Stanley M. Johanson, *The Migrating Client: Estate Planning for the Couple from a Community Property State*, in 9TH ANNUAL UNIV. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN., 800 (Miami, FL: University of Miami, 1975). Currently, fifteen common law states have enacted a version of the Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act (UDCPRDA), which provides for the testamentary disposition of only one-half of any imported community property upon the death of a spouse, including income and proceeds from community property. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 13.41.005–13.41.055 (LexisNexis 2016); ARK.

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1. The Evolution of Article XVI, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution

Although Texas is not unique in defining and characterizing marital property within its constitution, Texas courts have been distinctively dogmatic in asserting their authority as the exclusive arbiters of constitutional interpretation with respect to characterizing community and separate property.²⁴ In this area, the scope of the legislature's authority is confined to delineating the rights of management, control, and the disposition of marital property; the rights of creditors; and the formalities and parameters of constitutionally authorized marital property agreements.²⁵ As such, any discussion of the relevant tenets and the development of case law must necessarily begin with a review of the history and evolution of article XVI, section 15 of the Texas constitution and its statutory predecessors.

The ganancial property system—later known as the community property regime—is rooted in the concept of the marriage as a partnership, as well as the idea that giving each spouse an equal share of the industry and labor of both of the spouses better serves the economic, moral, and social goals of marriage as an institution.²⁶ The Spanish conquistadors introduced, and Mexico maintained, the ganancial property system over many of the territories that form the southern and western borders of what is now the United States of America.²⁷ As states acquired their independence from Mexico, they could choose to either retain the Spanish civil law system or adopt the common law system along with the rest of the United States.²⁸ In these isolated and rugged frontiers, wives usually worked on farms and ranches alongside their husbands, and when their husbands were away, wives took up the duties as heads of their households.²⁹ As such, recognition of marriage as a partnership of equals held a certain appeal as

CODE ANN. §§ 28-12-101 to -113 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-20-101 to -111 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-458 to -466 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.216–228 (Thomson Reuters 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 510-2 to -30 (LexisNexis 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 391.210 to .260 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 557.261–.271 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 519A.01 to .11 (Thomson Reuters Cum. Supp. 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-9-101 to -120 (2017); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 6-6.1 to -.7 (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31C-1 to -12 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.705–.775 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2b-101 to -111 (LexisNexis Cum. Supp. 2017); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-315 to -324 (LexisNexis 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-7-720 to -729 (LexisNexis 2017).

24. See Joseph W. McKnight, *Texas Community Property Law: Conservative Attitudes, Reluctant Change*, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 98 (1993).

25. See *Arnold v. Leonard*, 273 S.W. 799, 804–05 (Tex. 1925).

26. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, *PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY* § 11.1, at 24 (2d ed. 1971).

27. *Id.* at 24–25.

28. *Id.*

29. *Id.* at 25.

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compared to the common law doctrine of coverture, in which wives merged into their husbands' legal identity and lost virtually all their property rights other than mere title to real estate.³⁰ In the context of the relatively rare instances of divorce, however, there was a corresponding trade-off to this partnership concept of marital property—that is, there would be no awards of permanent alimony to either spouse.³¹

In Texas, the origin of marital property law began in 1820 in the Mexican territories of Spain when “Moses Austin, a citizen of the United States, requested that Governor Martinez donate a tract of land for foreign colonization.”³² In response, the Spanish government issued a decree authorizing viceroys and governors to grant tracts of land to colonists moving into what is now Texas.³³ Even after Mexico won its independence from Spain in 1824, Stephen F. Austin, Moses Austin’s son, successfully pursued the land grant.³⁴ Although Mexico continued applying the Spanish civil law, most of its Anglo colonists did not.³⁵ The Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 would also prove to be influential in the early development of Texas law.³⁶ As a result, the colonists’ first enactment of criminal and civil codes—the “Instructions and Regulations” of 1824—reflected a mix of both Spanish civil law and English common law.³⁷

In 1836, independence from Mexico resulted in the adoption of Texas’s first constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of Texas, a constitution that did not contain any specific provisions governing marital property.³⁸ On January 20, 1840, a year after it enacted the common law system of coverture, the Congress of the Republic of Texas enacted a statute that adopted the common law as its general body of legal principles while also maintaining a system of marital property based on Spanish civil law.³⁹ Specifically, the 1840 act characterized all property as common property, while carving out a specific definition of the wife’s separate property to include the lands, slaves, and paraphernalia that the wife brought into the marriage; the land and slaves that the wife acquired by gift, devise, or descent during the marriage; and any increases in such slaves during the marriage.⁴⁰ The 1840 act only addressed the ownership of the

30. *Id.* at 25–26.

31. *See* Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 218–19 (Tex. 1982).

32. 38 ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE: MARITAL PROPERTY AND HOMESTEADS § 1.17, at 23 (West 1993).

33. *Id.*

34. *See id.*

35. *See id.*

36. *See id.*

37. *See* LEOPOLD, *supra* note 32, § 1.18, at 25. *See* McKnight, *supra* note 24, at 73–74.

38. *See* LEOPOLD, *supra* note 32, § 1.21, at 34.

39. *See* LEOPOLD, *supra* note 32, § 1.22, at 37. *See* McKnight, *supra* note 24, at 75.

40. LEOPOLD, *supra* note 32, § 1.22, at 37–38; *see also* McKnight, *supra* note 24, at 75.

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wife's separate property because under the common law doctrine of coverture, the husband already had virtually full control over all of the property.⁴¹

Article VII, section 19 of the Texas constitution of 1845, which Texas adopted upon joining the United States, included the following provision governing marital property rights:

All property, both real and personal, of the wife, owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, shall be her separate property; and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the rights of the wife in relation as well to her separate property as that held in common with her husband. Laws shall also be passed providing for the registration of the wife's separate property.⁴²

On March 13, 1948, the legislature replaced the 1840 act with a statute that defined the separate property of both the husband and wife to include "all property, both real and personal" that the spouses acquired before their marriage or that which the spouses obtained during their marriage by gift, devise, or descent, as well as "the increase of land or slaves thus acquired."⁴³ Although the meaning of the term "increase" eventually became the subject of some judicial controversy, the Texas Supreme Court ultimately concluded that this statutory language was no broader than the constitutional definition.⁴⁴ In any event, despite the fact that Texas adopted new constitutions in both 1861 (upon seceding from the Union) and 1866 (upon rejoining the Union), the constitutional provision of 1845 remained unchanged.⁴⁵ The Texas constitution of 1869—the so-called "Reconstruction Constitution"—simply provided that "[t]he rights of married women to their separate property, real and personal, and the increase of the same, shall be protected by law."⁴⁶ Aside from changes in

41. *Cartwright v. Hollis*, 5 Tex. 152, 159 (1849); LEOPOLD, *supra* note 32, § 1.22, at 37-38. See McKnight, *supra* note 24, at 75.

42. TEX. CONST. OF 1845, art. VII, § 19, available at <http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/DART07.html>.

43. 1847-1848 Tex. Gen. Laws 77, § 2, reprinted in 3 H.P.N. Gammel, *The Laws of Texas 1822-1897*, at 77, 78 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898).

44. *Arnold*, 273 S.W. at 802. See, e.g., *De Blane v. Lynch*, 23 Tex. 25 (1859). See also LEOPOLD, *supra* note 32, § 1.25 at 41.

45. See TEX. CONST. OF 1861, art. VII, § 19, reprinted in 5 H.P.N. Gammel, *The Laws of Texas 1822-1897*, at 19 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). See also LEOPOLD, *supra* note 32, § 1.25, at 41.

46. TEX. CONST. OF 1869, art. XII, § 14, available at <http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/GART12.html>.

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punctuation and grammatical form, article XVI, section 15 of the 1876 constitution represented a return to the language of the 1845 provision.⁴⁷

Since 1876, Texas has adopted several amendments to article XVI, section 15. The November 2, 1948 amendment allows spouses to agree in writing to partition current or future community property into separate property without prejudice to pre-existing creditors.⁴⁸ The November 4, 1980 amendment recast the language of the 1948 clause as gender-neutral and added two new provisions—one allowing spouses to agree in writing to treat the current or future income from one spouse’s separate property as that spouse’s separate property, and the other creating a presumption that one spouse’s gift of property to the other spouse also includes the income that could arise from that gifted property.⁴⁹ The November 3, 1987 amendment allows spouses to agree in writing that if one spouse dies, all or part of the spouses’ community property becomes the surviving spouse’s property.⁵⁰ Finally, the November 2, 1999 amendment allows spouses to agree in writing to convert all or part of their separate property, whether owned by either or both of them, to community property.⁵¹

2. *The Inception of Title Rule*

The Texas constitution defines separate property as the property that a spouse owns or claims before the marriage and the property that a spouse acquires during the marriage by gift, devise, or inheritance.⁵² Under the inception of title rule, as interpreted by Texas courts, “[t]he date of acquisition of the right rather than the date of acquiring possession or of the final vesting of the title, is determinative” of the character of marital property as community or separate.⁵³ With respect to property that a spouse acquires prior to the marriage, the same is true for the term “claim.”⁵⁴

47. Compare TEX. CONST. OF 1845, art. VII, § 19, available at <http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/DART07.html>, with TEX. CONST. OF 1876, art. XVI, § 15, available at <http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/IART16.html>.

48. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (amended 1948). The 1948 amendments also removed the language regarding the registration of the wife’s separate property and replaced the phrase “her separate property” with the phrase “the separate property of the wife.” *Id.* The Texas Supreme Court has a longstanding aversion to spouses defining their own marital property rights, which culminated with its decision in *King v. Bruce* and the adverse tax consequences that arose therefrom. *King v. Bruce*, 201 S.W.2d 803, 809 (Tex. 1947). See McKnight, *supra* note 24, at 85–86.

49. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (amended 1980).

50. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (amended 1987).

51. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (amended 1999).

52. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.

53. 1 OCIE SPEER & EDWIN S. OAKES, SPEER’S MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS, § 388, at 564–65 (4th ed. 1961).

54. *Id.* § 403, at 602.

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That said, however, the inception of title rule is not the end of the story.⁵⁵ Consistent with the principles of Spanish civil law, if the labor or industry of either spouse or the community funds of both spouses cause the value of the spouse's separate property to increase, the community may be entitled to some measure of reimbursement.⁵⁶

3. *Income from Separate Property Under the Spanish Rule*

In *De Blane v. Hugh Lynch & Co.*, the Texas Supreme Court first articulated the rule that income from separate property (in that case, cotton grown on the wife's separate land through the labor of her separate slaves) would be classified as community property.

The principle which lies at the foundation of the whole system of community property is, that whatever is acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and wife, shall be their common property. It would be an unnecessary consumption of time, to quote authorities for this proposition.

It is true, that in a particular case, satisfactory proof might be made, that the wife contributed nothing to the acquisitions; or, on the other hand, that the acquisitions of property were owing wholly to the wife's industry. But from the very nature of the marriage relation, the law cannot permit inquiries into such matters. The law, therefore, conclusively presumes that whatever is acquired, except by gift, devise or descent, or by the exchange of one kind of property for another kind, is acquired by their mutual industry. If a crop is made by the labor of the wife's slaves on the wife's land, it is community property, because the law presumes that the husband's skill or care contributed to its production; or, that he, in some other way, contributed to the common acquisitions.⁵⁷

Since the definition of separate property became constitutional in 1845, Texas courts have characterized certain items—such as rents, dividends, and interest generated from separate property—as community property.⁵⁸ Consistent with the tenets of Spanish civil law, this rule naturally evolved within a predominately land-based economy where “most things till touched by the hand of man are wholly unproductive [and] requir[e] labor to make useful the natural growth of the earth.”⁵⁹

55. See *infra* Part II.A.2.

56. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.402, 3.404, 3.405, 3.409 (West 2006); *Vallone v. Vallone*, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982); *DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN*, *supra* note 26, § 73, at 168–70.

57. *De Blane v. Hugh Lynch & Co.*, 23 Tex. 25, 28–29 (1859).

58. See *SPEER & OAKES*, *supra* note 53, §§ 416–17, at 617–19. While cash dividends of separate stock or mutual funds are considered community income, capital gains distributions are considered mutations. See *Jones v. Jones*, 804 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1991, no writ).

59. See *DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN*, *supra* note 26, § 71, at 160–61. See also *GEORGE MCKAY*, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 176, at 242 (1910).

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Among the other community property regimes, Idaho, Louisiana, and Wisconsin follow this so-called “Spanish rule.”⁶⁰ That said, of all of the jurisdictions that follow the Spanish rule, Texas law is particularly inflexible. In Idaho, Louisiana, and Wisconsin, spouses have an option to unilaterally re-characterize the income from their own separate property and opt out of the Spanish rule.⁶¹ Furthermore, the Wisconsin statute also provides that unless the trust’s terms provide otherwise, any distribution of principal or income to a married beneficiary from a trust funded by a third party is characterized as the beneficiary’s “individual” property.⁶² In Texas, no such exceptions exist.

In any case, the language of the *De Blane* opinion highlights three aspects of the Spanish rule that have played an important role in the development of Texas marital property law – the doctrine of mutations, the rule of implied exclusion, and the doctrine of onerous title.⁶³

4. The Doctrine of Mutations

In one of the earliest marital property law cases, *Love v. Robertson*, the Texas Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of mutations in determining the ownership of two slaves upon the husband’s death. The husband’s heir established that the husband had purchased one slave for \$700 and partially purchased another slave by making a down payment of \$330 using his separate funds.⁶⁴ As such, the court ruled that both slaves, whose inception of title was derived from separate funds, would *also* constitute the husband’s separate property (albeit subject to a community claim for the amount owed on the purchase price of the second slave as of the date of the husband’s death).⁶⁵ Although the court recognized the conflicting

60. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (Michie 2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2339 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(4) (West 2009). By contrast, Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington all apply the divergent “American rule.” See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213(A) (West 2017); CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a)(3) (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.130 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8(E) (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.16.010, 26.10.020 (West 2016).

61. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2339 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.31(7p), 766.59 (West 2009). Subject to certain formalities, a spouse in Louisiana or Wisconsin may simply declare, in writing, that income from certain separate property will be characterized as separate property. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2339 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.31(7p), 766.59 (West 2009 & Supp. 2017). In Idaho, re-characterization can be achieved in two steps: (1) spouses can convey their separate property to a strawperson; and (2) the strawperson can execute an instrument of conveyance back to the spouse expressly, characterizing any income from the asset as separate property. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (Michie 2006). See also William A. Reppy, Jr., *Strategies for Strengthening the Case for Separate Property Classification of Assets Under Idaho Law*, 26 IDAHO L. REV. 425, 447–50 (1990).

62. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(7)(a) (West 2009).

63. See *infra* Part II.A.4–6.

64. See *Love v. Robertson*, 7 Tex. 6, 6–7 (1851).

65. See *id.* at 11-12.

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principles of Spanish civil law, it drew upon the law of business partnerships in favoring the separate property characterization over the community.⁶⁶

Under a strict application of the rule of implied exclusion, one could certainly argue that any gains realized from the sale of separate property during the marriage should be considered community property.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, courts continue to adhere to the rule that mutations and changes in *form* do not affect the *character* of property as separate so long as the original source for its acquisition can be traced and identified by clear proof.⁶⁸

5. The Rule of Implied Exclusion

In *Kellett v. Trice*, a case decided nearly a century before the 1999 Texas constitutional amendment, the Texas Supreme Court considered the effect of a transfer of separate property to a strawperson in trust immediately prior to attempting to convert the assets into the spouses' community property.⁶⁹ The court held that when spouses acquire property by gift during their marriage, the constitutional definition determines the character of that property and not the agreement of the spouses—that is, property received by gift is always separate property, regardless of who the donor is.⁷⁰

The *Kellett* case set the stage for the rule of implied exclusion, which the Texas Supreme Court first pronounced in *Arnold v. Leonard*, which is the most ubiquitous opinion in Texas marital property law.⁷¹ Beginning in 1911, the Texas Legislature enacted a series of statutes that whittled away at the common law restrictions of coverture and expanded the powers of married women with respect to marital property.⁷² Among these changes was an attempt to characterize rents and revenue derived from a spouse's

66. *Id.* at 7–8. Similarly, the early courts concluded that the term “increase,” which was included within the statutory definition of separate property in the 1848 act, encompassed only the profits that a spouse made in the sale or exchange of property. See, e.g., *Evans v. Purinton*, 34 S.W. 350, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1896, writ ref'd).

67. See *infra* Part II.A.5.

68. See, e.g., *Stephens v. Stephens*, 292 S.W. 290, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1927, writ dismissed w.o.j.); *DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN*, *supra* note 26, § 73, at 168; *MCKAY*, *supra* note 59, § 177, at 244–45. See also *SPEER & OAKES*, *supra* note 53, § 389.

69. See *Kellett v. Trice*, 66 S.W. 51, 52–53 (Tex. 1902), *superseded by constitutional amendment*, TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.

70. See *id.* at 53–54. *Accord* *Tittle v. Tittle*, 220 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Tex. 1949).

71. See *Arnold v. Leonard*, 273 S.W. 799, 801–02 (Tex. 1925).

72. See *id.* at 801–04.

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separate property as that spouse's separate property.⁷³ The Texas Supreme Court invalidated the statute with the following explanation:

[T]here is an implied prohibition against the legislative power to either add to or withdraw from the circumstances specified. . . . Since rents and revenues derived from the wife's separate lands are entirely with out [sic] the constitutional definition of the wife's separate property, . . . it follows that the [statutes] which undertake to make rents and revenues from the wife's separate lands a part of her separate estate, are invalid.⁷⁴

Simply put, the rule of implied exclusion provides that the constitutional definition of separate property is exclusive; and if the property that spouses acquire during their marriage does not fall squarely within that definition, then such property is, by negative implication, community property.⁷⁵

Prior to the constitutional amendments made in 1948, the Texas courts similarly voided any attempts by spouses to change the constitutional characterization rules by agreement.⁷⁶ As far as the courts were concerned, the character of marital property was wholly determined by the circumstances of acquisition, as described in the constitutional definition.⁷⁷ In this context, the judicial rule of implied exclusion created a system that deviated from the Spanish civil law.⁷⁸

Notwithstanding the supremacy of the constitutional definition, there is one notable exception when the Texas Legislature successfully added a statutory category of separate property.⁷⁹ In 1925, the Texas Legislature enacted a statute that provided the following: "compensation for personal injuries sustained by the wife shall be her separate property, except such actual and necessary expenses as may have accumulated against the husband for hospital fees, medical bills, and all other expenses incident to

73. *See id.*

74. *Id.* at 802, 804.

75. *See* Thomas M. Featherston Jr. & Julie A. Springer, *Marital Property Law in Texas: The Past, Present and Future*, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 861, 868 (1987). The *Kellett* opinion precipitated this strict reading of the Texas constitution; the court held that spouses could not gift separate property to the community through the use of a trust because all of the gifts that the spouses acquired during their marriage were separate property as a matter of constitutional law. *See id.* at 865–66. That said, the 1999 amendment to the Texas constitution now allows spouses to agree to transmute their separate property into community property. *See supra* Part II.A.1.

76. *See* *King v. Bruce*, 201 S.W.2d 803, 807–08 (invalidating an attempt to partition community property into separate property of the spouses); *see generally* *Gorman v. Gause*, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm'n. App. 1933, judgment adopted) (invalidating an agreement between the spouses, which stipulated that there would be no community property), *superseded by constitutional amendment*, TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.

77. *See, e.g., King*, 201 S.W.2d at 807–08.

78. *See supra* Part II.A.4–5. Under Spanish civil law, for example, both spouses could jointly receive gifts of property that was considered common. *See* MCKAY, *supra* note 59, § 168, at 234.

79. *See* *Graham v. Franco*, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972).

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the collection of said compensation.”⁸⁰ Citing the *Arnold* opinion, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that this statute was unconstitutional.⁸¹ But in 1972, the Texas Supreme Court overruled the decision and upheld the statute based on the following reasoning:

[I]t is our conclusion that, in adopting the provisions of Section 15 of Article 16 of our constitution, the people did not intend to change the common law or the Spanish law under which Texas operated so as to make a cause of action for injuries to the wife an asset of the community. A personal injury, and the chose in action created, was not ‘property’ at common law as then understood, and it was not property ‘acquired’ by any community effort. If it was ‘property’ under the common law, the Spanish law, or the Texas law, its character was separate, or personal, to the wife. In using the word ‘property,’ the framers of the constitution apparently had in mind property which could be given, bought and sold, and passed by will or by inheritance.⁸²

Such language reveals how the Texas Supreme Court defines property and explains what it means to acquire such property within the meaning of the doctrine of onerous title, which is discussed in the next section.⁸³

6. *The Doctrine of Onerous Title*

Beyond the strict application of the rule of implied exclusion, another important consideration plays a role in the characterization of marital property—the distinction between onerous title and lucrative title.⁸⁴ Onerous title arises when either spouse acquires property through labor, industry, or other valuable consideration (other than consideration consisting wholly of such spouse’s separate property).⁸⁵ In contrast, lucrative title arises as a product of a third party’s donative intent.⁸⁶ Under Spanish civil law, property acquired by onerous title was characterized as common property, but unless the donor indicated otherwise, property acquired by lucrative title was characterized as the donee spouse’s separate

80. N. Tex. Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1927, writ ref’d) (quoting TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4615 (West 1925) (repealed 1970)).

81. *See id.* at 780.

82. *Graham*, 488 S.W.2d at 395. “[T]he recovery is a replacement, in so far as practicable, and not the ‘acquisition’ of an asset by the community estate.” *Id.* at 394.

83. *See infra* Part II.A.6.

84. *See* DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, *supra* note 26, § 62, at 127.

85. *See id.*

86. *See id.*

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property.⁸⁷ In *De Blane*'s explanation for the conclusive presumption behind these statutory—and now constitutional—definitions, the Texas Supreme Court cited a fundamental principle of community property law: property that is acquired by the joint efforts of the spouses is considered community property.⁸⁸

Over a century later, in *Norris v. Vaughan*, the Texas Supreme Court considered the characterization of oil and gas royalties, looking beyond the doctrine of mutations to whether the petitioner could meet the “burden to prove an expenditure of community effort so as to impress community character upon the separate asset.”⁸⁹ The court also noted that each spouse who owns separate property has the right to exercise “[r]easonable control and management . . . necessary to preserve the separate estate and put it to productive use” without necessarily characterizing the output of such efforts as community.⁹⁰ In contrast, with respect to leases negotiated and acquired by spouses during the marriage but attributed to one spouse’s talent and labor, “community rights may attach to any beneficial estate . . . whether perfected or merely inchoate.”⁹¹

In *Graham v. Franco*, the court noted that in *Norris*, it “reverted to [an affirmative] test more akin to that prevailing under the Spanish and Mexican law, and several [of its] early opinions . . . dealing with community property.”⁹² As such, a broad application of the doctrine of onerous title could certainly contradict the rule of implied exclusion.⁹³ Nonetheless, the Texas Supreme Court has used the doctrine of onerous title, and courts should continue to apply this doctrine in deciding close cases.

B. Texas Trust Law

The law of express trusts is governed by the Texas Trust Code, and to the extent not inconsistent with that statute, an established body of common

87. *Id.* at 127–28. Spanish civil law excluded remuneratory gifts from the classification of lucrative title. *See id.* § 70. *See also* *Hardin v. Hardin*, 681 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ) (classifying contributions to a trust by a former employer of the beneficiary spouse as a gift).

88. *De Blane v. Hugh Lynch & Co.*, 23 Tex. 25, 29 (1859).

89. *Norris v. Vaughan*, 260 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Tex. 1953).

90. *Id.* at 681.

91. *Id.*

92. *Graham v. Franco*, 488 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. 1972). That said, in the *Graham* opinion, the court’s discussion of the doctrine of onerous title is dicta. *See id.* at 393 (“It is not necessary, however, to here make a decision on the correctness or applicability of *Norris v. Vaughan* and related cases and the concept of ‘onerous title.’”).

93. For example, the rule of implied exclusion provides that even rents and revenues derived from separate property acquired by gift, devise, or bequest belong to the community. *See supra* Part II.A.5.

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law developed by the Texas courts.⁹⁴ Under this body of law, a trust is considered a fiduciary relationship with respect to certain property which arises from the manifestation by a settlor (or “trustor” or “grantor”) of an intention to subject a trustee, who holds legal title to the property, to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person – the beneficiary.⁹⁵ And in this context, the Texas Trust Code sets forth the means of creating an express trust.

A trust may be created by:

- (1) a property owner’s declaration that the owner holds the property as trustee for another person;
- (2) a property owner’s inter vivos transfer of the property to another person as trustee for the transferor or a third person;
- (3) a property owner’s testamentary transfer to another person as trustee for a third person;
- (4) an appointment under a power of appointment to another person as trustee for the donee of the power or for a third person; or
- (5) a promise to another person whose rights under the promise are to be held in trust for a third person.⁹⁶

More specifically, to create an express trust, the following must be present: (1) the settlor must have the necessary capacity to make a transfer title, or possession, to the subject trust property; (2) the settlor must intend to create a trust relationship; there must be trust property; and (3) unless the trust consists of personal property and the trustee is neither the settlor nor the beneficiary, there must be written evidence of the terms of the trust.⁹⁷ By its terms, the trust may be revocable or irrevocable; but if the terms are silent on this issue, the trust is considered revocable.⁹⁸

The settlor determines the rules for the distribution and use of trust property.⁹⁹ Generally speaking, through the use of a trust, the settlor may attach the appropriate strings to condition and delay the enjoyment of the trust property, and in certain circumstances, may even protect a

94. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 111.001, .003, .005 (Thomson Reuters 2014). The Texas Trust Code, contained within Subtitle B of Title 9 of the Texas Property Code, effectively substituted the former Texas Trust Act and applies to all trusts and transactions relating to such trusts created on or after January 1, 1984, and all transactions related to trusts created before that date. *Id.* Within this article, as in the Texas Trust Code, the term “trust” refers to an “express trust,” as opposed to the equitable remedies of a “constructive trust” or a “resulting trust.” *Id.*

95. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(4) (Thomson Reuters 2014).

96. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.001 (Thomson Reuters 2014).

97. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 112.002, .004, .005, .007 (Thomson Reuters 2014).

98. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.051 (Thomson Reuters 2014).

99. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.033 (Thomson Reuters 2014).

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beneficiary's interest against claims of third parties.¹⁰⁰ For example, spendthrift trusts contain provisions that prohibit the voluntary or involuntary transfer of a beneficial interest "before payment or delivery of [that] interest to the beneficiary"; however, such provisions are not enforceable to "prevent the [settlor-beneficiary's] creditors from satisfying claims from the settlor's interest in the trust estate."¹⁰¹ Similarly, when the trustee has the discretion to make distributions to the beneficiary, neither the beneficiary nor the beneficiary's creditors may force the trustee to distribute trust income, and court may not substitute its own discretion for that of a trustee unless there is fraud, misconduct, or clear abuse of discretion.¹⁰²

Unless public policy demands otherwise, a court will uphold a settlor's property right to establish a trust under Texas law.¹⁰³ For example, a settlor may not effectively shield assets from liability to the settlor's own creditors by transferring those assets to a spendthrift trust for the settlor's own benefit.¹⁰⁴ And even with respect to a third party-settled trust, a court may order the trustee of a spendthrift trust to fulfill the beneficiary parent's child support obligation from trust assets that the beneficiary parent would otherwise be required to receive or, in the case where distributions are discretionary, from the income of the trust.¹⁰⁵

C. *The Problem of Characterizing Income from a Separate Property Trust*

Unlike a corporation or a partnership, a trust is not considered a separate legal entity under Texas law, but a form of property ownership in which a settlor transfers legal title to the trustee and equitable title to the beneficiaries.¹⁰⁶ It is often said that the beneficiaries are the "real owners"

100. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035 (Thomson Reuters 2014 & Supp. 2017).

101. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(a), (d) (Thomson Reuters 2014 & Supp. 2017).

102. *Di Portanova v. Monroe*, 229 S.W.3d 324, 330 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (explaining that a guardian could not seek a declaratory judgment to compel a trustee to make distributions for the benefit of the ward when discretion was limited to what the trustee considered the beneficiary's best interests). Put another way, the right of a beneficiary's transferee or creditor to compel a distribution from a discretionary trust cannot exceed that of the beneficiary. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 cmt. b (1957).

103. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.031 (Thomson Reuters 2014).

104. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(d) (Thomson Reuters 2014 & Supp. 2017).

105. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.005 (Thomson Reuters 2014). However, such liability is secondary, as the trustee may only be ordered to make such disbursements after the court has ordered the beneficiary-parent to pay a certain amount of child support. See *Kolpack v. Torres*, 829 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); *In re Marriage of Long*, 542 S.W.2d 712, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ).

106. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(4) (Thomson Reuters 2014). See also SPEER & OAKES, *supra* note 53, § 450, at 30. As such, if the sole trustee is, or becomes, the sole beneficiary, then the legal title and equitable interests are said to merge, and the trust ceases to exist, unless it is a third party-settled spendthrift trust. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.034 (Thomson Reuters 2014).

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of the trust property vis-à-vis the trustee, the settlor, and the estate of a predeceased beneficiary.¹⁰⁷ Nonetheless, in other contexts, the trustee is clearly treated as the owner of the trust property.¹⁰⁸ With respect to the third party beneficiary of a spendthrift trust and a discretionary trust, certain important incidents of ownership are clearly lacking—namely, alienability and liability of property for the owner’s creditor claims.¹⁰⁹

This duality of legal and equitable interests gives rise to a certain discord with Texas marital property law.¹¹⁰ That is, although property of one spouse acquired during the marriage by gift, devise, or inheritance was an individual right protected from common sharing under Spanish civil law, the deferred enjoyment of the trust relationship did not exist in this system.¹¹¹

That said, the degree of conflict between these two sets of principles is ultimately limited by the doctrine of mutations.¹¹² As a general matter, when a spouse who is both a settlor and a beneficiary conveys separate property to a trustee, both the legal and equitable interests in the property retain the same character.¹¹³ The same is true of a trust funded with community property.¹¹⁴ Therefore, the relevant issue is not the characterization of the property transferred to the trustee before or during the marriage or the proceeds or mutations from such property, but rather the income generated by the property during the marriage within the meaning of the Spanish rule.¹¹⁵ As such, the remainder of this article is limited to addressing the following questions: *under what circumstances, if any, should the income of a trust funded with one spouse’s separate property be characterized as community property?* Should the right to trust income be treated as a property interest retained or acquired as part of the original conveyance of separate property—a mutation that retains its original character? Or should the trust income that is earned or received during the marriage be treated like any other income the spouses acquired during the marriage? Part III discusses the attempts by the courts and commentators to

107. See e.g., *Hallmark v. Port/Cooper-T. Smith Stevedoring Co.*, 907 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); *City of Mesquite v. Malouf*, 553 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); *Arnold v. S. Pine Lumber Co.*, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186, 123 S.W. 1162, 1168 (Texarkana 1909, writ dismiss’d).

108. See e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.082 (Thomson Reuters 2014).

109. See 72 TEX. JUR. 3D TRUSTS §§ 35, 37 (2003); *Hughes v. Jackson*, 81 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1935) (“[a discretionary] trust may be so created that no interest vests in the [beneficiary, and] . . . no interest goes to the third party until the trustee[] ha[s] exercised [such] discretion.”)

110. See *supra* Part II.A.

111. See DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, *supra* note 26, § 69, at 154.

112. See *supra* Part II.A.4.

113. See e.g., *Hopper v. Hopper*, 270 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1954, writ dismiss’d).

114. See e.g., *Pratt v. Godwin*, 61 Tex. 331, 334 (1884).

115. See *supra* Part II.A.3.

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answer these questions and the resulting evolution of three different theories.¹¹⁶

III. THE PREVAILING THEORIES FOR CHARACTERIZING TRUST INCOME

As noted above, for marital property characterization issues to arise under Texas law, a trust must be funded with separate property or assets that would have constituted separate property had the beneficiary spouse acquired them directly.¹¹⁷ Thus, if assets are transferred to a trust during the marriage, the beneficiary spouse must first establish that the assets were acquired by the beneficiary spouse prior to the marriage or the transfer is attributable to a gift, devise, or bequest; otherwise, the trust and all of its income are characterized as community property.¹¹⁸ In addition, during the marriage, the beneficiary spouse must have an interest in the income of the trust (assuming that the concept of income can be consistently defined).¹¹⁹

Furthermore, questions regarding the character of income from a separate property trust must be answered within the context of the inception of title rule. Under what circumstances does a beneficiary spouse's interest in trust income become "property", and when is such trust income "acquired", within the meaning of the Texas constitution? Does the beneficiary spouse acquire the equitable interest in trust income when the settlor transfers assets to the trust? Or can an interest in trust income only be acquired only after the trust assets have actually generated income? Or does the beneficiary spouse only acquire a property interest when something is actually received from the trustee? The Texas courts have adopted no less than three distinct theories to address these threshold questions.

A. *The No-Greater-Interest/Present Possessory Right Rule*

1. *Early Case Law: From Creditor Claims to Divorce*

The first and the last time the Texas Supreme Court directly ruled upon the characterization of a spouse's interest in trust income was in *Hutchison v. Mitchell*.¹²⁰ In 1852, the husband conveyed a tract of land and twenty-eight slaves to a third party trustee, stating that the trustee "should

116. See *infra* Part III.

117. See *Dickinson v. Dickinson*, 324 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (holding that a community estate has no interest during the time that the beneficiary spouse is only a remainder beneficiary).

118. See *id.* at 658–59.

119. See *id.*

120. See generally *Hutchinson v. Mitchell*, 39 Tex. 488 (1873).

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permit [the wife] to retain said property in her own possession and for her own sole and separate use,' and should permit her 'to receive the rents, issues and profits' of said property"; and in 1858, the husband assisted the trustee to use the proceeds and the crops generated from the trust to acquire another plantation subject to a trust "for the separate use, occupation and enjoyment of [the wife], free from the intervention and control of all other persons whomsoever."¹²¹ The wife held the power to direct the trustee to sell, exchange, or convey the property, and the trustee was to "convey the legal title to her heirs upon her death, unless otherwise directed by her will."¹²² Several years later, one of the husband's creditors sought execution against the trust property acquired from the proceeds of the original land and the crops the husband grew on that land.¹²³ Recognizing that the crops would have been community property if the trust assets had been conveyed directly to the wife, the court concluded that "the separate equitable estate of the wife is fully recognized, and the rules of the common law, and no other law, apply."¹²⁴

We can find nothing in any of the constitutions or laws of the state or republic which would prevent a married man from declaring an express trust in favor of his wife, and giving her the exclusive use and enjoyment of all the rents, issues and profits of the trust estate, provided there is no fraud in the transaction against creditors.¹²⁵

The court rejected the creditor's argument that only the trust principal—not trust income—could be considered separate property.¹²⁶ Rather, trust law effectively trumped community property law, and the trustee was deemed the owner of the trust property and its income notwithstanding the wife's rights to possession and use.

Several decades later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the *Hutchison* opinion "as a decision of the Semicolon or Carpet Bag Court of Texas, and therefore not authoritative."¹²⁷ However,

121. *Id.* at 488.

122. *Id.*

123. *Id.* at 491–92.

124. *Id.* at 493.

125. *Id.*

126. *Id.* at 488.

127. *Comm'r v. Porter*, 148 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1945), *aff'g*, 2 T.C. 1244 (1943). In doing so, the Fifth Circuit cited *Taylor v. Murphy*. *Taylor v. Murphy*, 50 Tex. 291 (1878). In *Taylor*, referring to the decision of *Roundtree v. Texas*, 32 Tex. 286 (1869), Chief Justice Moore indicated that "in my individual opinion . . . I cannot regard the opinion of this tribunal as authoritative exposition of the law involved in the cases upon which it was called to pass, but merely as conclusive and binding determinations of the particular case in which such opinion was expressed." *Id.* at 295.

The Military Court decided *Roundtree*. See James R. Norvell, *Oran M. Roberts and the Semicolon Court*, 37 TEX. L. REV. 279, 281–83 (1958–59). During the period of tumultuous
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the United States Claims Court has since recognized the *Hutchison* opinion—and correctly so.¹²⁸

With the exception of its equivocal decision in *Martin Brown Co.*, a case that also involved the claims of a husband's creditors, the Texas Supreme Court never again considered these issues.¹²⁹ Nonetheless, the lower appellate court opinions have consistently maintained that assets held in trust are not the property of either spouse.¹³⁰

In *Shepflin v. Small*, the husband's judgment creditors erroneously instituted garnishment proceedings against a tenant of the wife's separate

congressional reconstruction, the military commander of Louisiana and Texas, Major General Phillip Sheridan removed all of the members of the Supreme Court of Texas and appointed their successors, who served from the latter part of 1867 through 1869. *See id.* at 281–83. As an associate justice of the supreme court later observed, the Military Court “had no Texas constitutional basis and hence its decisions do not operate as precedents under the rule of stare decisis.” *Id.* at 287.

That said, the successor to the Military Court decided the *Hutchison* case. *Id.* at 284–87. In the election of November 30, 1869, while still under military rule, Texas adopted a new constitution and elected a new governor, E.J. Davis. *Id.* Under the constitution of 1869, the Supreme Court of Texas had three members appointed by the governor. *Id.* This version of the Supreme Court served from 1870 through 1873. *Id.* In its final reported case, *Ex parte Rodriguez*, based on the presence of a semicolon in the constitution, the court made a textually acceptable, but politically unpalatable, decision attempting to invalidate the election of December 2, 1873. *Id.*; *Ex parte Rodriguez*, 39 Tex. 706 (1873). The decision of this so-called Semicolon Court was disregarded. 37 TEX. L. REV. at 284–87. In January 1874, Governor Davis's term ended and newly-elected Governor Richard Coke appointed a different slate of judges pursuant to constitutional amendments increasing the number of justices from three to five. *Id.*

The Fifth Circuit is not the first court to confuse the decisions of the Military Court with those of the Semicolon Court. *Id.* at 287 n.21. To be sure, due in large part to the unpopularity of its final decision, the Semicolon Court had its own detractors. *Id.* Chief Justice Oran Roberts, who was appointed by Governor Coke, wrote that “no Texas lawyer likes to cit [sic] any case from the volumes of the Supreme Court reports which contain the decisions of the court that delivered that opinion, and their cases are, as it were, tabooed by the common consent of the legal profession.” Oran M. Roberts, *The Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas for Its Fifty Years of Statehood, 1845–1895*, 2 WOOTEN, A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF TEXAS 1, 201 (1898), as quoted in James R. Norvell, *Oran M. Roberts and the Semicolon Court*, 37 TEX. L. REV. 279, 281–83 (1958–1959). That said, the perception of wholesale illegitimacy of the Semicolon Court opinions is questionable. Unlike the Military Court, its authority was based on the Constitution of 1869—the same authority under which Governor Coke was elected. *Id.* Moreover, subsequent justices of the Supreme Court of Texas, including Judge Roberts, did in fact explicitly cite or overrule opinions of the Semicolon Court. *Id.* at 290–91. Finally, contrary to the aspersions cast in the *Porter* case, only one of the four members who served during the short term of the Semicolon Court—Judge Moses Walker—could be classified as a “carpetbagger.” *Id.* at 294. *See also* Hans W. Baade, *Chapters in the History of the Supreme Court of Texas: Reconstruction and “Redemption” (1866-1882)*, 40 ST. MARY'S L. J. 17, 78–121 (2008).

128. *Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States*, 4 Cl. Ct. 6 (1983), *aff'd*, 753 F.2d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1985). *See also* Frank G. Newman, *Income Distributions from Trusts—Separate or Community Property?*, 29 TEX. B. J. 449, 450 (1966) (“Although this decision was rendered during the reconstruction era, an otherwise sound decision should not be discredited on that basis alone.”).

129. The court affirmed that the husband's business creditor could not reach the interest collected by a trustee for the wife with respect to a loan made from the trust to the husband's business, but noted that “[a]s to the grounds of that conclusion, we are not in accord.” *Martin Brown Co. v. Perrill*, 13 S.W. 975, 977 (Tex. 1890).

130. *See infra* Part III.B–C.

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real property for back rent due.¹³¹ Consistent with the law at the time, when the husband had authority over the wife's assets, the husband and wife then transferred all of the wife's separate real property to a family member "as trustee, in trust to collect the rents and appropriate the same to the support and maintenance of the wife and to the education and maintenance of their children."¹³² The court held "the conveyance to [the trustee] in trust had the effect of withdrawing the rents from the community estate, except so far as they had been subjected to the writ of garnishment."¹³³

To be sure, the court's subsequent ruling in *Kellett* overruled these cases inasmuch as the spouses attempted to use a trust to convert separate property into community property.¹³⁴ Nonetheless, the courts carried these fundamental principles forward.¹³⁵

McClelland v. McClelland was the first case in which a Texas court considered the characterization of trust income in a divorce proceeding.¹³⁶ At the time of the divorce, the husband was the beneficiary of a testamentary trust established under his father's will, and during his lifetime, the trustee was to make cash distributions to the husband for his support and maintenance and additional advances if he was "provident and careful."¹³⁷ In denying the wife's claim to the undistributed trust income, the court focused on the testator's right to devise the property and its income, exempting those assets from the beneficiary's liabilities through what was "in effect" a spendthrift trust, and concluded as follows:

Those of his creditors or others who should seek an interest in the estate through him would have no greater right than he would have, and the limitation upon his right thus imposed would extend to a claim asserted by his wife, who was seeking to recover an interest in this estate. If the income arising from the estate was not available to [the husband] and could not be reached by him, the right of his wife would be no greater than his, and she would not be allowed to work out and enjoy a right in his estate that was denied him.¹³⁸

131. *Shepflin v. Small*, 23 S.W. 432, 432 (El Paso 1893, no writ).

132. *Id.*

133. *Id.* at 433. Two years after the *Shepflin* case, the court considered a case with a similar trust and concluded, in dicta, that "[t]he property belonged to the wife, and she had the right to convey the land to a trustee so as to withdraw the rents from the community estate, and obtain therefrom a support for herself and children." *Monday v. Vance*, 32 S.W. 559, 559 (San Antonio—1895, no writ) (emphasis added). See also *Sullivan v. Skinner*, 66 S.W. 680 (San Antonio—1902, writ ref'd) (refusing to allow one of the husband's creditors to garnish the rents the wife received pursuant to a devise of a life estate).

134. See *supra* notes 69–70 and accompanying text.

135. See *infra* Parts III.B–C, IV.

136. See *McClelland v. McClelland*, 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd).

137. *Id.* at 354–56.

138. *Id.* at 358.

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The court also ruled that there was no community interest in the amounts that the trustee distributed to the husband or in the property acquired from those distributions.¹³⁹ The court appeared to view the trust property *and its income* as the object of the devise – a devise that was not complete until the beneficiary spouse had possession.¹⁴⁰ That is, the beneficiary spouse did not have a property interest until the trustee made distributions from the trust, and the court—giving the most deference to the testator who established the trust—treated the income that the beneficiary spouse received as a gift, and thus, separate property.¹⁴¹ Like the decisions in *Hutchison* and *Shepflin*, in addressing whether a beneficiary spouse acquired property from a trust, the *McClelland* court treated the non-beneficiary spouse like any other creditor of a beneficiary.¹⁴²

The *McClelland* decision predated the *Arnold* case, in which the court characterized separate property in strict accordance with the constitutional definition that was applicable to the relevant circumstances.¹⁴³ As such, one could argue that the *Arnold* decision overruled the *McClelland* opinion to the extent that the husband actually acquired the trust income.

However, at least two courts have explicitly rejected this notion.¹⁴⁴ Several decades later, in *Buckler v. Buckler*, the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals followed the *McClelland* decision, as did the San Antonio Court of Appeals in *Currie v. Currie*.¹⁴⁵ In the latter case, the husband was the beneficiary of a testamentary trust (established in his great-grandfather's will) whereby the trustee was granted certain discretion to allocate receipts and expenditures between income and principal (including estate tax installments) and make distributions to the husband when the trustee determined the husband had “attained sound discretion and good business judgment.”¹⁴⁶ The wife attempted to assert that the amounts of undistributed income used by the trustee to pay estate taxes were community property.¹⁴⁷ The court concluded that “[s]ince [the husband] would not have any claim to such income other than an expectancy interest

139. *Id.* at 359.

140. Harvie Branscomb Jr. & G. Ray Miller Jr., *Community Property and the Law of Trusts*, 20 SW. L.J. 699, 725 (1966).

141. *See McClelland*, 37 S.W. at 359.

142. *See id.* at 358–59.

143. *See Arnold v. Leonard*, 273 S.W. 799, 800–01 (Tex. 1925).

144. *See Currie v. Currie*, 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1974, writ dismissed); *Buckler v. Buckler*, 424 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1967, writ dismissed).

145. *See Currie*, 518 S.W.2d at 388–89; *Buckler*, 424 S.W.2d at 515. The details of the trust are not discussed in the opinion except to note that, as in *McClelland*, the terms and provisions “so restricted and defined [the beneficiary spouse’s] rights and interests as to exclude his entitlement to undistributed income which the trustees had not seen fit to deliver to him.” *Buckler*, 424 S.W.2d at 516.

146. *Currie*, 518 S.W.2d at 388–89.

147. *Id.* at 388.

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in the corpus, it cannot be said that the community estate would acquire any interest.”¹⁴⁸

2. *The Long Case: The Present Possessory Interest Rule*

In *Long*, the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals considered the effect of a trust provision that is relatively common within modern trusts.¹⁴⁹ The husband was the beneficiary of an irrevocable trust established by his parents prior to his marriage for which one-half of the trust property was distributable when the husband attained the age of twenty-five and the rest of the trust property was distributable when the husband attained the age of thirty.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, the trustee was granted the discretion to make distributions of income to the husband when the husband attained the age of twenty-one, which occurred shortly after he was married.¹⁵¹ When the husband attained the age of twenty-five, several months before the suit for divorce was filed while the spouses were separated, the husband orally communicated his intent to allow the trustees to continue to manage his share of the distributable trust assets.¹⁵² Nonetheless, the court ultimately found that, at the age of twenty-five, the trust terminated as to the one-half portion over which the husband held a “present possessory interest” and which became his separate property.¹⁵³

In light of the subsequent judicial interpretations, it is notable that in *Long*, the court did not classify all of the undistributed income from the trust as community, but only the income attributable to the one-half of the trust property over which the husband held a present possessory right and only to the extent that such income was earned after the husband’s right to such trust property became possessory.¹⁵⁴ The existence of a present possessory interest over one-half of the husband’s trust distinguished this case from the *Currie* case, which involved a right to distributions that was within the trustee’s discretion.¹⁵⁵ In essence, the *Long* court merely

148. *Id.* at 389.

149. *In re Marriage of Long*, 542 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ).

150. *Id.* at 715.

151. *Id.* at 717.

152. *Id.* at 716.

153. *Id.* at 717.

154. *See id.*

155. *Id.* at 718. The court also stated that the facts mirrored those in the case of *Mercantile National Bank at Dall. v. Wilson*, but the court appears to have misread the facts of that case by noting that “undistributed income was in the hands of the trustees but the beneficiary had a present possessory interest in the funds.” *Long*, 542 S.W.2d at 718. *See Mercantile Nat’l Bank at Dall. v. Wilson*, 279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1955, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Rather, the terms of the self-settled trust in the *Mercantile National Bank* case left the distribution of trust income to the discretion of the third-party trustee. *Mercantile Nat’l Bank at Dall.*, 279 S.W.2d at 653. *See infra* note 194 and accompanying text.

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extended the no-greater-interest rule from the concept of *actually* acquiring trust property through distributions (as in *McClelland*) to *constructively* acquiring trust property to the extent that the beneficiary spouse holds an unfettered right to withdraw trust assets.¹⁵⁶

Two years later, the same appellate court denied the community estate an interest in the undistributed income earned by a probate estate, spendthrift trusts established by third parties, and self-settled trusts funded with separate property.¹⁵⁷ Again, the court concluded “neither spouse actually or constructively acquired the undistributed trust and estate income during the marriage.”¹⁵⁸

Almost two decades later, with respect to trusts that the beneficiary spouse established prior to the marriage, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied this same analysis in *Lemke v. Lemke* and *Lipsey v. Lipsey*.¹⁵⁹ In a pair of related cases, the Tyler Court of Appeals also applied this analysis to characterize a mandatory income interest as separate property where the beneficiary spouse did not have a present possessory right to the principal.¹⁶⁰ However, consistent with the court’s analysis in *Long*, the income subsequently earned on the undistributed trust income would be characterized as community property.¹⁶¹

3. *The Relationship Between the Right to Possession and Acquisition*

The courts in *McClelland*, *Long*, and their progeny equate the concept of acquisition for marital property characterization purposes with possession—either actual possession or an unfettered right to possession of the underlying trust property.¹⁶² That is, until the beneficiary spouse had such actual or constructive possession of the trust property, the courts would not consider *any* income attributable to that property as community. That said, certain commentators have criticized these holdings as

156. See *Long*, 542 S.W.2d at 718–19.

157. See *In re Marriage of Burns*, 573 S.W.2d 555, 556–57 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1978, writ dismissed).

158. *Id.* at 557.

159. *Lipsey v. Lipsey*, 983 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.); *Lemke v. Lemke*, 929 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).

160. See *Cleaver v. George Staton Co.*, 908 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, writ denied) [hereinafter *Cleaver I*]; *Cleaver v. Cleaver*, 935 S.W.2d 491, 493–94 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.) [hereinafter *Cleaver II*].

161. See *Cleaver I*, 908 S.W.2d at 470; *Cleaver II*, 935 S.W.2d at 493–94.

162. See *supra* Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2.

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inconsistent with a series of Texas Supreme Court cases decided between 1965 and 1976 that characterized retirement plan assets.¹⁶³

In *Herring v. Blakeley*, which involved an employer profit-sharing plan and an annuity funded by the employee spouse's contributions during the marriage, the supreme court ruled that there was no requirement that community property be reducible to immediate possession before the divorce court could exercise jurisdiction to determine each of the spouse's rights in such assets.¹⁶⁴ In *Busby v. Busby*, the court extended the doctrine to include United States military retirement benefits, even where the entitlement to such benefits could be subsequently changed or eliminated by federal statute.¹⁶⁵ In both of these cases, the employee spouse's rights were vested in the sense that the employee spouse had done all that he needed to do to claim the rights.¹⁶⁶ In other words, the relevant query was not so much whether the employee-spouse would receive the retirement benefits, but *when* and *how much*. In both cases, the court held that the trial judge could address timing issues in fashioning the appropriate remedy.¹⁶⁷

In *Cearley v. Cearley*, the court significantly extended these principles to military retirement benefits that had not yet vested at the time of divorce. That is, the employee-spouse had not completed the requisite period of service to receive the benefits at the time of the divorce.¹⁶⁸ The court held that both vested and nonvested pension rights represent a property interest and to the extent that such rights derive from employment during the marriage, they comprise a community asset.¹⁶⁹ Notably, the *Cearley* court quoted the following language from the Supreme Court of California's opinion in *Brown v. Brown* (overruling its own prior case law):

This mischaracterization of pension rights has, and unless overturned, will continue to result in inequitable division of community assets. *Over the past decades, pension benefits have become an increasingly significant*

163. See Donald R. Smith, *Characterization of Marital Property*, J. STATE BAR OF TEX. PROF'L DEV. PROGRAM, ADVANCED FAM. L. COURSE, at 145 (1991); Harvey L. Davis, *Income Arising from Trusts During Marriage Is Community Property*, 29 TEX. B.J. 901, 976 (1966).

164. *Herring v. Blakeley*, 385 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. 1965).

165. *Busby v. Busby*, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554-55 (Tex. 1970) (*superseded by statute*, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983, Pub.L. No. 97-252 § 1001, 96 Stat. 730-35, *as stated in* Thomas v. Piorkowski, 286 S.W.3d 662, 669 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.). In this case, the amount of the retirement benefits distributed to the husband-employee could be changed or eliminated by federal statute, as pointed out in a vigorous dissenting opinion. *Id.* at 555 (Walker, J., dissenting). Although the amount of retirement benefits may be subject to change, one must consider the likelihood that military retirement benefits would be completely terminated by an act of the United States Congress, which may be the reason this "contingency" was disregarded in the majority opinion.

166. *Herring*, 385 S.W.2d at 845; *Busby*, 457 S.W.2d at 553-54.

167. See *Herring*, 385 S.W.2d at 845; *Busby*, 457 S.W.2d at 553-54.

168. *Cearley v. Cearley*, 544 S.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Tex. 1976).

169. See *id.*

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*part of the consideration earned by the employee for his services. As the date of vesting and retirement approaches, the value of the pension right grows until it often represents the most important asset of the marital community.*¹⁷⁰

A contrary decision would “[compel] an inequitable division of rights acquired through community effort.”¹⁷¹ That said, it is worth noting that at the time of the divorce, the employee’s service could be terminated—voluntarily or involuntarily—and the employee could receive nothing.¹⁷²

However, as emphasized in the language quoted above, the court appeared to invoke the doctrine of onerous title as a matter of necessity.¹⁷³ That is, these benefits represented the fruits of labor provided during the marriage, and to leave them off the table out of a slavish adherence to the inception of title rule was simply not acceptable.¹⁷⁴ Instead, the court adopted a remedy to deal with these contingencies—it would award an appropriate portion of the pension on a prospective basis as amounts were paid after the divorce decree.¹⁷⁵

The *Herring*, *Busby*, and *Cearley* cases all involved a spouse’s right to benefits established with earnings attributable to personal services that a spouse provided during the marriage.¹⁷⁶ That is to say, neither *Herring*, *Busby*, nor *Cearley* involved a gift, which is usually the source of the property of a private trust.¹⁷⁷ That said, the Texas Supreme Court has refused to expand the scope of these holdings, which seem to place the doctrine of onerous title above the inception of title rule, outside of the circumstances involved.¹⁷⁸ In the wake of changes in the applicable federal law, the lower appellate courts have significantly circumscribed the continued application of the *Herring*, *Busby*, and *Cearley* opinions.¹⁷⁹ Generally speaking, in determining the character of trust income, the Texas courts have not deferred to these cases.¹⁸⁰

170. *Id.* at 664 (emphasis added) (quoting *In re Marriage of Brown*, 544 P.2d 561, 566 (Cal. 1976)).

171. *Id.* at 544 S.W.2d at 663 (quoting *Brown*, 544 P.2d at 562).

172. *See id.* at 563.

173. *See Vallone v. Vallone*, 644 S.W.2d 455, 462–63 (Tex. 1982) (Sondock, J., dissenting).

174. *See id.*

175. *Cearley*, 544 S.W.2d at 664.

176. *See Herring*, 385 S.W.2d at 844; *Busby*, 457 S.W.2d at 552; *Cearley*, 544 S.W.2d at 662.

177. *See Herring*, 385 S.W.2d at 846; *Busby*, 457 S.W.2d at 553; *Cearley*, 544 S.W.2d at 662.

178. *See, e.g., Nail v. Nail*, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972) (refusing to apply the *Busby* holding to characterize accrued goodwill as community property).

179. *See ANNE E. MELLEY, Marital Property*, 3 TEX. FAM. L. SERV. § 18:61–:63 (West 2003).

180. In one case involving a trust that a former employer established, the court does reference the *Herring* case for the proposition that benefits paid on retirement may not be a gift even though the employee never made any contributions to the plan. *Hardin v. Hardin*, 681 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, no pet.). *See also Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States*, 4 Cl. Ct. 6, 12–13(1983) (distinguishing the *Herring* case involving a plant funded with community property).

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B. The Conduit Principle

1. The Federal Estate Tax Cases (1948–1980)

In 1948, federal courts applied a new approach to marital property characterization—the idea that a beneficiary spouse effectively owns the trust property, and thus, the trust is merely a conduit for the income generated by that property.¹⁸¹ Commentators subsequently referred to this approach as the “conduit principle.”¹⁸² These cases centered around what is now section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which generally provides that the decedent’s taxable estate includes the value of assets gifted during the decedent’s lifetime for which the decedent retained certain rights to the income therefrom.¹⁸³ All of these cases involved a gift of community property to an irrevocable trust for the lifetime benefit of just one spouse.¹⁸⁴ Under Texas law, the donee spouse’s interest in the trust principal was certainly separate property. But upon the death of the other spouse, the deemed donor spouse, the following question arose: under the Spanish rule, did the donor spouse retain a community right to the income generated by the property gifted to the trust, thereby resulting in the inclusion of half of those assets in the taxable estate?

In *Estate of Hinds v. Commissioner*, the United States Tax Court concluded that under the circumstances, a portion of the trust assets would be included in the donor spouse’s gross estate.¹⁸⁵ In effect, because the decedent spouse held a community property right to income from separate property, the court treated the decedent spouse as a de facto owner of the trust. For both procedural reasons and practical reasons, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the United States Tax Court’s judgment “[w]ithout . . . at all approving the decision of the Tax Court.”¹⁸⁶ Nonetheless, for over two

181. See Branscomb & Miller, *supra* note 140, at 714. In the context of the income tax, until 1948, the federal courts had never considered the characterization of *undistributed* trust income before the underlying trust terminated. See *McFaddin v. Comm’r*, 2 T.C. 395 (1943), *aff’d in part, rem’d in part* to 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945). In this sense, the Fifth Circuit’s conduit approach to the estate tax cases is not so much inconsistent with, as it is an evolution of, the equitable interest theory.

182. See Branscomb & Miller, *supra* note 140, at 714.

183. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) (West 2012). As the federal estate and gift tax regimes are, for the most part, unified, the practical effect of section 2036(a) is to undo the lifetime gift with the retained interest valued at the date of the gift and bring the assets gifted back to the donor-decedent’s taxable estate at a value determined on the date of death. See I.R.C. § 2001(b) (West 2012).

184. See Branscomb & Miller, *supra* note 140, at 713.

185. *Estate of Hinds v. Comm’r*, 11 T.C. 314, 322-23 (1948), *aff’d on other grounds*, 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950) (citing the *Porter* opinion and consistently applying the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Texas community property law from that opinion).

186. *Estate of Hinds*, 180 F.2d at 932.

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decades, the government continued to take the position that the decision in *Hinds* was good law.¹⁸⁷

In 1977, the United States Tax Court decided two additional estate tax cases in the government's favor and in accordance with its decision in *Hinds*—*Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner*, which involved an outright gift, and *Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner*, which involved a lifetime gift in trust.¹⁸⁸ In *Frankel v. United States*, however, a federal district court reached an opposite result in favor of the estate.¹⁸⁹ Eventually, the Fifth Circuit considered all three of these cases on appeal and ultimately held that the donor spouse could not be said to have retained a right to income within the meaning of section 2036(a).¹⁹⁰ While the Fifth Circuit based its decision in large part on the construction of the estate tax statute, it *also* considered the effects of each spouse's management powers under the Texas statutes.¹⁹¹ That is, with respect to income from separate property, which is the donee spouse's sole-management community property, the court concluded that the donor spouse only had "ownership" in an almost abstract sense."¹⁹²

2. *The Mercantile National Bank Case*

Prior to the Fifth Circuit's shift away from the conduit principle, the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals applied the conduit approach in *Mercantile National Bank v. Wilson*.¹⁹³ Shortly before getting married, the wife created an irrevocable trust for her own benefit with assets received from her father, naming her father as the trustee "to keep said bonds for [her] and collect the interest thereon and to reinvest the revenue derived therefrom, or to deliver same to [her]."¹⁹⁴ When her husband died, a creditor of his estate asserted that the trust income earned during their marriage, whether distributed or undistributed, represented community property subject to the debts of the husband's estate.¹⁹⁵ Without citing any case law, the court concluded that the trust income was income from the wife's separate

187. See Rev. Rul. 75-504, 1975-2 C.B. 363, *revoked by* Rev. Rul. 81-221, 1981-1 C.B. 178.

188. See *Estate of Castleberry v. Comm'r*, 68 T.C. 682 (1977); *Estate of Wyly v. Comm'r*, 69 T.C. 227 (1977), *rev'd*, 610 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1980). These decisions ultimately prompted a proposed amendment to the Texas constitution providing for a presumption that interspousal gifts include the income from the gifted property. See *supra* Part II.A.

189. See *Wyly*, 610 F.2d at 1285.

190. See *id.* at 1294.

191. See *id.* at 1288-89.

192. *Id.* at 1289.

193. See *Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dall v. Wilson*, 279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1955, writ *ref'd n.r.e.*).

194. *Id.* at 653.

195. *Id.* at 653-54.

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property, albeit exempt from the husband's creditors by statute.¹⁹⁶ That is, since the courts' decisions in the nineteenth century creditor cases (discussed above), the Texas legislature had enacted a statute exempting a spouse's sole-management community property, including income from the spouse's separate property, from the other spouse's creditor claims.¹⁹⁷ As such, the court's characterization is dicta because, regardless of whether the trust income could have been characterized as separate property or income from separate property, the decision would have been the same.¹⁹⁸ Still, this dicta remains unchallenged as an anomaly in Texas case law.¹⁹⁹

In 1966, Professor Harvey Davis argued that Texas marital property law mandates the use of the conduit principle.²⁰⁰ Davis's first conceptual step was to discard all pre-1925 case law as contrary to the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in *Arnold*, from which he quoted the following:

The test during coverture relates to the *method* by which the property is *acquired*. If the method be by *gift, devise, or descent* to the wife, then the Constitution makes the property belong to the wife's separate estate. If the *method of acquiring* during marriage be *different*, then the property falls without the class of separate estate of the wife, as fixed by the Constitution.²⁰¹

In *Arnold*, the actual issue at controversy was whether the legislature could alter the exclusive, constitutional definition of separate property as the courts had previously interpreted it.²⁰² Yet, before property can be characterized as community or separate, one must first determine whether that property has been *acquired* by either spouse, and the *Arnold* case did not foreclose a court's ability to interpret what acquisition means, constitutionally speaking.²⁰³ Nonetheless, Professor Davis concluded that the conduit principle should apply in all instances:

196. *Id.* at 654.

197. *See* Newman, *supra* note 128, at 532.

198. *See id.*

199. *See id.* The United States Claims Court distinguished *Mercantile National Bank* case from prior Texas case law because the trust was self-settled, and because it terminated on the death of the wife's parents, the wife had an expectation of recapturing the corpus during her lifetime. *Wilmington Trust Co. v. U.S.*, 4 Cl. Ct. 6, 11 (1983), *aff'd*, 753 F.2d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

200. *See* Davis, *supra* note 163, at 901–02.

201. Davis, *supra* note 163, at 901–02 (quoting *Arnold v. Leonard*, 273 S.W.799, 801 (Tex. 1925) (emphasis supplied by Professor Davis)).

202. *Arnold*, 273 S.W. at 803.

203. *See id.* In this regard, one could certainly make the argument that a spouse acquires an equitable interest in the income of a trust funded with separate property upon creation. *See Reynolds v. Reynolds*, 388 So.2d 1135, 1149–50 (La. 1980) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part on rehearing) (“[T]he distributed income, in my view, was not the ‘fruit’ of the beneficiary’s separate property, but was the materialization of the gift of a future interest in property.”). The case involved the characterization of both distributed and undistributed income, with respect to a discretionary spendthrift

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[I]t is seen that a married spouse may receive a vested equitable title to the trust corpus as a gift, either before or during marriage. This trust corpus is separate property. During marriage, income arises from the trust corpus. This income is community property upon the moment of its creation because it is not property acquired by gift, devise or descent. It makes no difference that the income is not then distributed or is not reduced to possession or cannot be reduced to possession by the married beneficiary. It is and remains community property nonetheless.²⁰⁴

In essence, the trust relationship is merely a conduit for the beneficiary spouse's true ownership of trust assets. Unlike the equitable interest theory (discussed below), it matters not whether the trust income is distributed because the terms of the trust are irrelevant.²⁰⁵ To Professor Davis, a trust is not a product of property law; rather, the terms of trust are reduced to nothing more than a contract, and like spouses could not agree to change the character of community property or separate property at the time the *Arnold* case was decided, a settlor cannot change the marital property character of income from separate property.²⁰⁶

Professor Davis's strident advocacy of the conduit principle was not without detractors who correctly observed that treating all distributed and undistributed trust income as community property disregards every settlor's property right to delineate the trust beneficiaries and makes every non-beneficiary spouse a de facto beneficiary.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, the conduit principle does not even attempt to balance the interests of the settlor and the interests of the spouses – marital property law simply trumps trust law, and that is the end of the story.

Within a year after his views were published, Professor Davis made the same arguments before the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals in *Buckler v. Buckler*, a case factually similar to *McClelland*.²⁰⁸ The court rejected the argument on the following grounds:

trust. *Id.* at 1136–37. The beneficiary spouse did not execute and record affidavit of paraphernality to declare the trust distributions as her separate property, as permitted under Louisiana law. *Id.* at 1137. The court held that the beneficiary spouse never acquired incidents of ownership over the undistributed income, which was under the control and dominion of the trustee, but that the distributions of trust income *did* belong to the community. *Id.* at 1142. *See also* DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, *supra* note 26, § 71.2, at 164–65.

204. Davis, *supra* note 163, at 977.

205. *Id.* at 976–77. Query how title to trust property falls into the community where multiple beneficiaries may be entitled to discretionary distributions. Any attempt by a court to invade and divide the undistributed trust income upon the death or divorce of a beneficiary would invariably affect the other beneficiaries.

206. Davis, *supra* note 163, at 976.

207. *See* William V. Counts, *Trust Income-Separate or Community Property?*, 30 TEXAS B.J. 851, 916–17 (1967).

208. *See* *Buckler v. Buckler*, 424 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1967, writ dismissed).

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Arnold v. Leonard held that property acquired during marriage other than as the result of gift, devise or descent necessarily could not be part of the separate estate, in view of the Texas Constitution, and hence would have the character of community property. The decision does overrule a portion of the holding in McClelland, but it does not overrule the holding which is material to the question before us. As to such the Supreme Court, which disposed of the application for writ of error in McClelland by the notation ‘writ refused,’ has not had occasion to reconsider the decision therein made. It is not the province of a Court of Civil Appeals to anticipate that the Supreme Court would, if afforded the opportunity, reverse itself as applied to a prior holding it has made. We are bound by the prior holdings of that court, specific or construable.²⁰⁹

And since the *Mercantile National Bank* case was decided, no other Texas court has entertained the notion that all trust income earned during a beneficiary spouse’s marriage, whether distributed or undistributed, should be characterized as community property.

C. The Equitable Interest Theory

Following the changes in marital property law made after the turn of the century, nearly three decades passed before the courts considered the characterization of a beneficial interest in a trust—first in the federal income tax and, and then, among the Texas appellate courts. Within this context, the courts eventually developed the “equitable interest theory.”²¹⁰ Under this theory, an equitable interest in a trust is considered property acquired by the beneficiary spouse for these purposes.²¹¹ That said, the particular application of this theory depends upon the answers to two questions: (1) is the beneficiary spouse’s interest in trust income considered property acquired when the beneficial interest vested (as opposed to when the income is earned or distributed); and (2) must the beneficiary spouse actually hold a beneficial interest in the trust principal for the Spanish rule to apply to the trust income received?²¹²

209. *Buckler*, 424 S.W.2d at 516. The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals has also rejected the notion that the *McClelland* opinion is no longer valid in light of the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in *Arnold*. *Sharma v. Routh*, 302 S.W.3d 355, 363 n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

210. *Branscomb & Miller*, *supra* note 140, at 713.

211. *See id.*

212. *See Counts*, *supra* note 207, at 914–95.

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*I. The Federal Income Tax Cases (1925–1983): The Presumptive
Equitable Interest in Trust Principal as Property*

In the context of federal income tax, the United States Supreme Court answered both of the foregoing questions in the negative.²¹³ Under the original Income Tax Act of 1913, taxable income was defined as “gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever, including the income from but not the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent.”²¹⁴ In *Irwin v. Gavit*, an individual taxpayer who was only entitled to a share of the income of a testamentary trust argued that because he had no interest in the trust principal, the gift that he received was his equitable interest in the income; and as such, the distributions from the trustee should not have been subject to income tax.²¹⁵ The Court disagreed:

[A] gift of the income of a fund ordinarily is treated by equity as creating an interest in the fund. Apart from technicalities, we can perceive no distinction relevant to the question before us between a gift of the fund for life and a gift of the income from it.²¹⁶

That said, it is worth noting that this presumptive concept of a beneficiary’s interest in trust principal instructed the federal courts’ interpretations of Texas law in a time before married couples in community property states were allowed to file joint returns and effectively split their separate taxable income.

In *Terry v. Commissioner*, the husband and wife each recognized half of the taxable income that the wife received as a distribution from a testamentary trust on the grounds that such income constituted community property.²¹⁷ The government argued for the proposition that the trust income should have been treated as the wife’s separate property, and in making this argument, the government cited the *McClelland* opinion.²¹⁸ However, the Board of Tax Appeals concluded that the distributions represented community property and noted that the *McClelland* holding, unless confined to spendthrift trusts, could conflict with the subsequent decision of the Texas Supreme Court in the *Arnold* case.²¹⁹ In affirming the judgment of the Board of Tax Appeals, the Fifth Circuit parroted the holding in *Gavit*, explaining that “[t]he devise to her of the income and

213. See *Irwin v. Gavit*, 268 U.S. 161, 167–68 (1925).

214. *Id.* at 166.

215. See *id.*

216. *Id.* at 167.

217. *Terry v. Comm’r*, 26 B.T.A. 1418, 1418–19 (1932), *aff’d*, 69 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1934).

218. *Id.* at 1419.

219. *Id.* at 1420.

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profits from that property for life had the effect of giving her the property itself for life.”²²⁰

In 1945, a series of similar United States Tax Court cases culminated in *Commissioner v. Porter*, a Fifth Circuit decision that involved spendthrift trusts established and administered in New York for the benefit of the settlor’s married daughters who resided in Texas.²²¹ In its opinion, the court summarily disregarded the authority of the *Hutchison* and *Sullivan* cases, incorrectly dismissed the holding of the *McClelland* case as dealing only with undistributed income, and concluded as follows:

[I]n view of the generally prevailing rule in Texas, that income from separate property falls when received into the community, it is certainly true that if by the use of a trust instrument this general rule can be departed from, the instrument must, in the most precise and definite way, and by the use of language of unmistakable intent, make that desire and intention clear. There is not a line in the trust instruments in question here to even suggest that the settlor of these trusts intended to change, as to the income his daughters should receive, the ordinary results flowing from the marriage state. . . . As long as the income was in the hands of the trustees and undistributed it was protected, but as soon as it was paid over, it passed to the daughters as their property, freely and completely alienable, and as fully subject as any other unrestricted property of theirs to the ordinary impact of the law.²²²

Notably, however, the court conditioned its intimation that the clearly expressed intent of the settlor could alter the classification of a beneficial interest in trust income on whether “in the [sic] light of the constitutional definition of separate property and of *Arnold v. Leonard*, supra, such purpose could be effectively expressed.”²²³ And in the other cases that the court decided in series with the *Porter* decision, the court added that the existence of a spendthrift clause was immaterial to its analysis.²²⁴

In weighing the persuasive value of a federal court’s interpretation of Texas law, one must appreciate that the agenda for determining matters of income taxation may very well differ from that of a Texas court determining the marital property rights of a spouse or creditor.²²⁵ In this

220. *Terry*, 69 F.2d at 969.

221. *See* *Comm’r v. Porter*, 148 F.2d 566, 567 (1945). *See also* *Snowden v. Comm’r*, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 509 (1944), *aff’d*, 148 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1945); *McFaddin v. Comm’r*, 2 T.C. 395 (1943), *aff’d in part, remanded in part to* 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945); *Sims v. Comm’r*, T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1944), *aff’d*, 148 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1945).

222. *Porter*, 148 F.2d at 568–69.

223. *Id.* at 568.

224. *See* *Sims*, 148 F.2d at 574; *McFaddin*, 148 F.2d at 573–74.

225. *See* *Terry*, 26 B.T.A. at 1420 (“What the [United States] Supreme Court has called income may not in Texas escape tax through a local decision that it is a bequest.”).

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respect, the nature of the question involved in these tax cases—the character and taxability of distributed trust income—has necessarily limited the scope of the federal court’s inquiry.²²⁶ The above-quoted language states that as long as the trust income remained *undistributed*, it was protected. On the other hand, in at least one other case from this same period, the language of the Fifth Circuit seems to echo the conduit principle.²²⁷ In effect, the only significant difference between the conduit principle and the federal courts’ permutation of the equitable interest theory (which presumes that there is always an interest in the trust principal) is timing – the former treats trust income as community property *when it is earned*, while the latter considers trust income to be community property only *when it is distributed*. If the undistributed trust income had not already been subject to income taxation at the trust level, then it is conceivable that the federal courts could have stretched their interpretation of Texas law to adopt the conduit principle.

In any event, these cases represent the last word of the federal courts in the context of the income tax. In 1948, Congress enacted section 12 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allowed all spouses to effectively split their income for federal income tax purposes, regardless of whether items of taxable income would be considered community or separate property.²²⁸ With the addition of section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code in 1954, income derived from a gift, devise, or bequest became taxable by statute.²²⁹ As such, trust income characterizations issues became moot for income tax purposes.²³⁰

In 1983, however, the United States Claims Court decided the last of the reported federal cases discussing the characterization of distributed and undistributed trust income in the context of the federal estate tax.²³¹ In *Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States*, the wife was the beneficiary seven irrevocable trusts established during her marriage by her parents and her husband for which she was only entitled to mandatory income distributions.²³² The sole issue before the court was the characterization of the property the wife acquired from trust distributions and the undistributed income that remained in the trusts.²³³ The government contended that

226. In only one case from this period did the federal courts consider the nature of *undistributed* trust income, and in that case, the income was earned after the trust was supposed to terminate by its own terms. See *McFaddin*, 148 F.2d at 573–74.

227. See *Comm’r v. Wilson*, 76 F.2d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 1935), *rem’g*, BTA Memo 1933-261 (“The corpus is theirs in equity, the legal title being conveyed to the trustee expressly for their benefit.”); *Branscomb & Miller*, *supra* note 140, at 714.

228. See Newman, *supra* note 128, at 533-35. See also I.R.C. § 6013 (West 2012).

229. See *id.* See also I.R.C. § 102 (West 2012).

230. See Newman, *supra* note 128, at 535.

231. *Wilmington Trust Co. v. U.S.*, 4 Cl. Ct. 6, 8–9 (1983), *aff’d*, 753 F.2d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

232. *Id.* at 7–8.

233. *Id.* at 8.

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because such items were community property, one-half of the value should have been included in the husband's gross estate.²³⁴ However, after thoroughly discussing the Texas case law and criticizing the Fifth Circuit's analysis of those cases, the court concluded as follows:

It is true, as stated by the Fifth Circuit in *Porter*, that the generally prevailing rule in Texas is 'that income *from separate property* falls when received into the community' . . . , but the court in both cases seemingly overlooked the circumstance that the income involved in each case was 'from' a trust corpus, and the trust corpus was not the 'separate property' of the beneficiaries of the trust. The beneficiaries had no right to or control over the corpus of the trust. Those powers were vested in the trustee.²³⁵

Notably, the United States Claims Court took a position that was contrary to the United States Supreme Court's rationale in *Gavit*, a decision which is never even mentioned²³⁶ That is, the United States Claims Court acknowledged the no-greater-interest rule reflected in the early Texas case law and concluded that (1) a spouse does not acquire any property until an income distribution is actually made, and (2) the resulting distribution is considered a gift to the beneficiary spouse, and thus, separate property.²³⁷

In any case, the Texas appellate courts have not yet adopted the presumptive equitable interest theory. That, at least two commentators have advocated for this approach on the grounds that, even with respect to a trust where income distributions are discretionary, the beneficiary can bring suit to compel distributions and hold the trustee liable for mismanaging the assets.²³⁸ As the argument goes, these rights constitute a sufficient property interest in the constitutional sense.²³⁹

2. *The Ridgell and Sharma Cases: The Actual Equitable Interest in Trust Principal as Property*

As another permutation of the equitable interest theory, three Texas courts have held that an actual interest in the trust corpus constitutes property for marital property characterization purposes, such that any of the

234. *Id.*

235. *Id.* at 14 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).

236. *See Irwin*, 268 U.S. at 167–68. In *Wilmington Trust*, the court noted that six of the seven trusts were settled by third parties and contained spendthrift provisions. *Wilmington Trust*, 4 Cl. Ct. at 7–8. But from its decision pertaining to all of the trusts, it is unclear whether and to what extent these factors were relevant.

237. *See Wilmington Trust Co.*, 4 Cl. Ct. at 14..

238. *See Branscomb & Miller*, *supra* note 140, at 714.

239. *See id.*

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distributions of trust income to the beneficiary spouse who holds such an interest would be considered community property.²⁴⁰ Unlike the opinions in the federal income tax cases (discussed above), these courts do not presume that an interest in income necessarily includes an interest in corpus, and as such, a beneficial interest that only provides for the distribution of income would not be considered community property.²⁴¹

In *Ridgell v. Ridgell*, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals considered two testamentary trusts that were established for the benefit of the wife by her parents.²⁴² The trustee was directed to pay all of the net income from the trust to the wife “quarter-annually or monthly as [the wife] may from time to time elect” and was granted the discretion to distribute principal to or for the benefit of the wife and her children in accordance with the following standard:

[A]s the Trustee . . . deems appropriate for their proper support, care and maintenance in reasonable comfort in accordance with their accustomed manner of living after taking into consideration, to the extent the Trustee deems advisable, any income or resources of such beneficiaries, outside this trust, know [sic] to the Trustee and reasonably available for these purposes.²⁴³

On each of the wife’s birthdays beginning with the fortieth birthday and ending with the fiftieth, the trustee was directed to make principal distributions to the wife of the lesser of \$25,000 or three percent (3%) of the value of the trust assets.²⁴⁴ The wife reached the age of forty and married the husband in 1978, and the divorce proceeding commenced in 1994.²⁴⁵

After citing *Long, Mercantile*, and *Wilmington*, the court announced its curious synthesis of Texas case law:

If the trust property may be considered her separate property, then the income it generated during the marriage may constitute community property. If [the beneficiary spouse] receives income distributions from

240. See *Ridgell v. Ridgell*, 960 S.W.2d 144, 145–48 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); *Sharma v. Routh*, 302 S.W.3d 355, 372–73 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.); *Benavides v. Mathis*, 433 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, rev. den.).

241. See *supra* Part III.C.1.

242. *Ridgell*, 960 S.W.2d at 145–48. *Ridgell* also involved a self-settled trust, funded with separate property, with the purpose of securing a loan to acquire real property for the wife’s daughter and granddaughter (“Trust #3”), but because the underlying loan held by the trust was subsequently extinguished with other expenditures of separate property and none of the increases in the stock holdings of the trust were attributable to items of income, the trust estate maintained its separate property status. *Id.* at 150–51. Another trust (“Trust #1”) dissolved prior to the marriage. *Id.* at 146.

243. *Id.* at 148 n.3.

244. *Id.* at 148–49, n.3.

245. See *id.* at 145–46.

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the trusts, the income must be community property. If [the beneficiary spouse] does not receive income from the trusts and has no more than an expectancy interest in the corpuses, the income remains separate property.²⁴⁶

At first blush, the second sentence suggests that the court adopted the presumptive equitable interest theory (a mandatory distribution of income necessarily means that the beneficiary spouse has an interest in trust principal); and the third sentence intimates that the conduit principle might apply to the undistributed trust income if the beneficiary spouse has “more than an expectancy interest in” trust principal.²⁴⁷ However, the ultimate holding of *Ridgell*—“the testamentary trusts grant to [the wife] possessory interests in the net incomes of the trusts and expectancy interests in the trust corpuses, revealing, at least *prima facie*, that the trust incomes during the marriage are community property”—appears to require that the beneficiary spouse hold *some* interest in principal before characterizing distributions of trust income as community in nature.²⁴⁸ The court also found that the terms of the trusts did not reflect an “unmistakable intent” on the part of the settlors *not* to have the trust income characterized as community property, notwithstanding the presence of a spendthrift provision.²⁴⁹ As such, the court characterized *all* of the trust income distributed to the wife during the marriage as community property.²⁵⁰

One must carefully consider what it means to have an expectancy interest in trust principal sufficient to cause *all* of the income distributions to be treated as community property. In *Ridgell*, for the first eleven years of the marriage, the wife received mandatory distributions of only a portion of the trust principal. While the court gave lip service to the *Long* opinion, the rules adopted by each of these courts produce very different results.²⁵¹ For example, assume that one of the trusts involved in the *Ridgell* case held \$1 million in assets on January 1, 1979, earning income at a rate of 5% per year, and for the sake of illustrative simplicity, assume the wife’s birthday was December 31. If the wife had opted to defer any of the mandatory

246. *Id.* at 148.

247. *Id.* at 148–49 (explaining that “[b]ecause [the wife] became a beneficiary by devise, her separate estate has equitable title to the trusts generally”). This “expectancy interest” language appears to be derived from the opinion in *Currie*, in which the court held that “[s]ince [the husband] would not have any claim to such income other than an expectancy interest in the corpus, it cannot be said that the community estate would acquire any interest.” *Currie v. Currie*, 518 S.W.2d386,389 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1974, writ *dism’d*). In that case, distributions from the trust were within the “uncontrolled discretion” of the trustee. *Id.* at 388.

248. *Ridgell*, 960 S.W.2d at 149.

249. *Id.*

250. *Id.*

251. *See id.* at 148–49.

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income and principal distributions until the end of 1980, the character of the distributions would be determined as follows:

	<u>[a] 1979:</u>	<u>[b] 1980:</u>
[1] Trust assets, beginning balance:	\$1,000,000	\$1,050,000
[2] Annual trust income:	50,000	52,500
[3] Actual distributions of income and principal:	-	152,500
[4] Trust assets, ending balance (line [1] + line [2] - line [3]):	\$1,050,000	\$ 950,000
[5] Unitrust amount (in 1979, line [1][a] x 3%; in 1980, line [1][a] - line [6][a] x 3%):	\$ 30,000	\$ 29,250
[6] Principal that may be withdrawn (lesser of line [5] or \$25,000):	\$ 25,000	\$ 25,000

Character of Distribution - Long Opinion:

[7] Present possessory interest on 12/31/79 (line [2][a] + line [6][a]):	\$ 75,000
[8] Portion of trust constructively received (line [7] ÷ line [4][a]):	7.143%
[9] Community property distributed - portion of 1980 income attributable to present possessory interest (line [2][b] x line [8]):	<u>\$ 3,750</u>
[10] Separate property distributed (line [3] - line [9]):	<u>\$ 148,750</u>

Character of Distribution - Ridgell Opinion:

[11] Community property distributed - all trust income since beneficiary had more than an expectancy interest in principal (lines [2][a] + [2][b]):*	<u>\$ 102,500</u>
[12] Separate property distributed (line [3] - line [6]):	<u>\$ 50,000</u>

* assumes undistributed income is not added to principal each year

Note that in *Ridgell*, principal distributions to the wife were left to the trustee's discretion for approximately four years before dissolution of the marriage (1990–1994).²⁵² Although the opinion does not describe the specific amounts of income and principal that the trustee distributed during this period, the language of the court's holding is all-inclusive, suggesting that a trustee's discretionary right to distribute trust principal to the spouse

252. See *id.* at 145–46.

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is also sufficient to characterize *all* distributions of trust income as community property.²⁵³

In *Sharma v. Routh*, the most recent opinion to broadly address these issues, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston adopted a rule similar to the holding of the *Ridgell* court.²⁵⁴ Specifically, the court considered the character of income distributed from two testamentary trusts that were established for a husband by his predeceased wife—the “Marital Trust” and the “Family Trust.”²⁵⁵ From the Marital Trust, the husband was entitled to quarterly distributions of income, as well as the following:

[S]uch amounts of trust principal to [the husband] as are necessary, when added to the funds reasonably available to [the husband] from all other sources known to [the trustee] . . . to provide for [the husband’s] health, support and maintenance in order to maintain him, to the extent reasonably possible, in accordance with the standard of living to which [the husband] is accustomed at the time of [the settlor’s] death.²⁵⁶

From the Family Trust, the husband could receive discretionary income and principal distributions under a standard similar to the provisions for distributions of principal from the Marital Trust.²⁵⁷ Both trusts provided for the remainder to pass to charity after the husband’s death.²⁵⁸ During the subsequent marriage, the husband received income distributions from both trusts and donated the amounts to charity, and although he was the trustee of the trusts, he did not exercise his discretion to make principal distributions to himself.²⁵⁹

In the context of some rather egregious circumstances, the court ruled that none of the income distributions from either of the trusts were community property.²⁶⁰ In doing so, it announced the following rule:

We conclude that, in the context of a distribution of trust income under an irrevocable trust during marriage, income distributions are community property only if the recipient has a present possessory right to part of the corpus, even if the recipient has chosen not to exercise that right, because

253. *See id.* at 148–49.

254. *Sharma*, 302 S.W.3d at 364.

255. *Id.* at 357–58.

256. *Id.* at 364.

257. *Id.* at 358.

258. *Id.* at 368–69.

259. *Id.* at 358.

260. *Id.* at 357. The husband filed for divorce within a few months after the marriage. *Id.* If the income from the two trusts had been classified as community property, then as a result of a seventeen-month marriage, the wife would have been entitled to half of the \$2,304,018 in trust distributions—all of which had been donated by the husband to charity. *See id.* at 358–59.

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the recipient's possessory right to access the corpus means that the recipient is effectively an owner of the trust corpus.²⁶¹

Notwithstanding this language's similarity to the present possessory interest approach adopted in *Long*, as well as the practical likelihood that the *Sharma* case's outcome would have been the same under that approach, the scope *Sharma* court's definition of a possessory right is nonetheless far broader than the standard articulated in *Long*.²⁶² Although it is clear that "some potential right" to trust principal would not be sufficient to constitute property acquired for marital property characterization purposes, the *Sharma* court also concluded that if the trustee "determined that such distributions were necessary for his maintenance[.]" then the beneficiary spouse would have a present possessory right.²⁶³ Although arguably dicta, this rule places *Sharma* in line with the equitable interest theory advanced in *Ridgell*.²⁶⁴ As one commentator described, "any interest at all in the corpus" is sufficient to classify all trust income distributable to the beneficiary spouse as community.²⁶⁵

In their herculean efforts to find a property interest upon which to link the characterization of trust income, the *Ridgell* and *Sharma* courts have articulated a rule that is not only arbitrary, but also divorced from economic reality.²⁶⁶ Consider the following example of a trust funded by a third party with the following fairly common provisions: (1) the trustee has discretion to distribute income—and if necessary, principal—for the health, education, maintenance, and support of the beneficiary spouse during her lifetime; and (2) any income that the trustee has not distributed is added to the principal at the end of each year. Assume that in Year 1 and Year 2, the trust assets earn interest and dividends of \$85,000 and \$75,000, respectively, and after determining that the beneficiary spouse needs \$80,000 per year for maintenance and support, the trustee distributes such amounts accordingly.

261. *Id.* at 364. The quoted language referring to "ownership," similar to the language used by the *Ridgell* court, often sounds like an application of the conduit principle, which treats all trust property as owned by the beneficiary spouse. *See supra* Part III.B. However, whereas the conduit principle subjects undistributed trust income to classification as community property, the equitable interest theory assumes income can only be acquired when distributed by the trustee. *See supra* Part III.B.1.

262. *Id.* at 368; *In re Marriage of Long*, 542 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ).

263. *Sharma*, 302 S.W.3d at 362, 365.

264. The *Sharma* court noted that the *Ridgell* opinion "does not distinguish between remainder beneficiaries and income beneficiaries who do not have a present possessory interest in the trust corpus[.] . . . this distinction is significant." *See id.* at 365 n.19. Nonetheless, the latter opinion supports the rule adopted in *Sharma*. *Id.*

265. Stephen M. Orsinger & Harold C. Zuflacht, 25 STATE BAR OF TEX., 32ND ANNUAL MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION INSTITUTE OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, at 10 (2009) [hereinafter Orsinger & Zuflacht] (emphasis supplied).

266. *See infra* note 268 and accompanying text.

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Applying the language of the *Sharma* opinion on an annual basis (as would be consistent with the requirement that undistributed income be added to principal annually), the distributions would be classified as follows:

	Distribution to Beneficiary Spouse:	Trust Income:	Principal Distributed:	Trust Income Classified as Community Property:
Year 1:	\$ 80,000	\$ 85,000	None	None
Year 2:	\$ 80,000	\$ 75,000	\$ 5,000	\$ 75,000

Because the trustee failed to exercise discretion to distribute any principal in Year 1, the beneficiary spouse would not have a present possessory right to the trust principal and would not acquire any portion of the trust property. Thus, as the *Sharma* opinion suggests, none of the trust income distributed by the trustee would be classified as community property.²⁶⁷

But what about Year 2? On the last day of Year 1, the undistributed income is added to principal, and the fiduciary accounting period starts over. Because the trustee *did* exercise discretion to distribute principal in Year 2 (i.e., to the extent the distribution exceeded trust income), *all* of the trust income that the trustee distributed to the beneficiary would be considered community property. If that interest in trust principal is considered the property that generates community income, as the *Sharma* opinion indicates, then a mere \$5,000 worth of principal is considered to have yielded a 1,500% return on investment.²⁶⁸ How could such a seemingly ridiculous economic result be avoided under this rule? Would the *Sharma* court simply disregard the trust provision that classifies undistributed income as principal each year?

At worst, the *Sharma* opinion offers a formulation of the equitable interest theory that produces arbitrary and absurd results. At best, the *Sharma* opinion poses more questions than answers. For example, the language above gives the trustee the authority to make principal distributions only after trust income is exhausted. Thus, by its very terms, the trustee must always distribute trust income before trust principal. As such, although the above illustration assumes that the Year 2 trust income becomes community property, one must ask how a beneficiary spouse can acquire income from separate property before acquiring the separate property itself.

267. See *Sharma*, 302 S.W.3d at 364.

268. See *id.*

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Suppose instead that a savvy settlor simply reversed the sequence of two words in this example as follows: the trustee is granted discretion to distribute *principal—and, if necessary, income*—for the health, education, maintenance, and support of the beneficiary spouse during her lifetime. This slight modification would result in practically no difference in the obligations and rights between the trustee and the beneficiary spouse. In either case, the trustee would be liable to the beneficiary spouse according to the same fiduciary standard for distribution, and to the extent of the trust’s distributable net income, the beneficiary spouse would still be subject to federal income taxation.²⁶⁹ However, under the *Sharma* rule, as a result of this one small change, presumably none of the distributions would be classified as community property until *all* trust principal is distributed.²⁷⁰ In an attempt to parse the proverbial trees, the *Ridgell* and *Sharma* courts have not only lost sight of the forest, but they have left the settlor and the trustee with a full battery of chainsaws.

Indeed, in a recent opinion adopting the holding in *Sharma*, the San Antonio Court of Appeals deferred entirely to the express provisions of the trust characterizing mineral royalties as “revenue” and “income” in determining whether the requisite present possessory interest existed.²⁷¹ Through the application of permissible fiduciary accounting principles, this court effectively allowed the settlor to dictate the terms of marital property characterization.

3. *The Use and Misuse of Fiduciary Accounting Principles*

In the nineteenth century, the choices of trust investments were simple and predictable – stocks and bonds paying quarterly dividends and interest, real estate yielding monthly rents, farms producing annual crops, and ranches raising regular livestock.²⁷² Using the analog of the legal life estate, settlors could simply designate income beneficiaries and remainder beneficiaries with relative certainty as to what quantum of benefits the settlor would convey.²⁷³ By the end of the twentieth century, however, the scope of available investment vehicles proliferated, and as such, the prudent

269. See I.R.C. § 662(a) (West 2012).

270. See *Sharma*, 302 S.W.3d at 357.

271. *Benavides*, 433 S.W.3d at 65-66.

272. See, e.g., *Shepflin*, 23 S.W. at 432-33. See generally John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, *Market Funds and Trust Investment Law* (1976), FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, Paper 498, at 3-5, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/498.

273. See Stephen P. Johnson, *Trustee Investment: The Prudent Person Rule or Modern Portfolio Theory, You Make the Choice*, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1993).

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investor rule increased the demands of the trustee.²⁷⁴ Unless the trust's terms provided otherwise, the trustee is expected to diversify in order to manage risk.²⁷⁵ The dictates of both the marketplace and the law have evolved away from standards that distinguish between income and principal to simply maximizing "total return."²⁷⁶ Likewise, the author submits that settlors have become less reliant upon the differentiation between income and principal in defining the relative interests of their beneficiaries.

Effective January 1, 2004, the Texas Legislature adopted modified versions of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Uniform Principal and Income Act (TUPIA).²⁷⁷ The Uniform Prudent Investor Act delineates the trustee's duties with respect to investing in recognition of "modern portfolio theory" (the centerpiece of which is the duty to diversify investments), all of which may be expanded, restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by the terms of the trust.²⁷⁸ The TUPIA governs the allocation of receipts and disbursements among income beneficiaries and remainder beneficiaries, and one of the primary purposes of this act is "to provide a means for implementing the transition to an investment regime based on principles embodied in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, especially the principle of investing for total return rather than a certain level of 'income' as traditionally perceived in terms of interest, dividends, and rents."²⁷⁹ Unlike the marital property characterization principles—which, as indicated in *Arnold*, are constitutionally fixed—the provisions of TUPIA that classify specific items as trust income or trust principal are subject to the following rules:

- Under the terms of the trust, the settlor may expressly define what constitutes income and principal, and in doing so, may deviate entirely from the default rules provided under TUPIA.²⁸⁰ The settlor may also include provisions that allow

274. See 4 AUSTIN W. SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 19.1.7, at 1405 (5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS] ("A trustee can no longer fulfill the trustee's investment duties merely by investing in property of one or more certain types.")

275. See 4 SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS, *supra* note 274, § 19.2, at 1427-34.

276. See 4 SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS, *supra* note 274, § 20.10.2, at 1579.

277. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 116.001, et seq., 117.001, et seq. (Thomson Reuters 2014) (originally enacted by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 659, § 1, ch. 1103 § 1).

278. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 117.003(b), 117.005 (Thomson Reuters 2014).

279. UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT prefatory note (1932) (revised 2000).

280. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.004(a)(1) (Thomson Reuters 2014). In the context of marital property characterization, the Texas courts appear to grant the settlor great deference in characterizing what would otherwise be fiduciary accounting income as principal. See *Taylor v. Taylor*, 680 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

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the trustee to accumulate income and add the undistributed income to the balance of principal each year.²⁸¹

- The settlor may expressly grant the trustee the discretion to allocate receipts and disbursements between income and principal and deviate entirely from the default rules as provided under the TUIPIA.²⁸² The settlor may also excuse the trustee of the duty to exercise such discretion impartially by expressing intent to favor one or more beneficiaries.²⁸³
- Subject to certain conditions, the TUIPIA grants any disinterested trustee the power to adjust between income and principal to the extent the trustee considers it necessary to comply with the prudent investor rule in situations where the trustee is required or authorized to make distributions based on a measure of trust income and cannot otherwise comply with the duty of impartiality to both income and remainder beneficiaries by following the terms of the trust or the TUIPIA rules.²⁸⁴ Included among the many factors the trustee may consider in exercising this power to adjust are the intent of the settlor and the identity and circumstances of the beneficiaries.²⁸⁵ A court may not override the trustee's decision to exercise or not exercise this discretionary power to adjust unless there is an abuse of discretion by the trustee.²⁸⁶
- Under the TUIPIA, a trustee is not required to make trust property productive of income unless the settlor claimed the federal gift or estate tax marital deduction with respect to the transfer of property to the trust, the mandatory income beneficiary has not received sufficient amounts of income and principal, and the mandatory income beneficiary has expressly requested that trustee make the trust property productive of income.²⁸⁷

Even if the specific classifications set forth in the TUIPIA apply—either by default or because the trustee has opted to use them as a safe harbor—those rules may diverge from the judicial characterizations of

281. *See id.*

282. *See* TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.004(a)(2) (Thomson Reuters 2014).

283. *See* TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.004(b) (Thomson Reuters 2014).

284. *See* TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.005(a), (c)(6), (7) (Thomson Reuters 2014).

285. *See* TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.005(b)(2), (3) (Thomson Reuters 2014).

286. *See* TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.006(a) (Thomson Reuters 2014).

287. *See* TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.176 (Thomson Reuters 2014). *See generally* I.R.C. §§ 2056(a), (b)(5), (b)(7), (b)(8), 2523(a), (e), (f), (g), 2056A (West 2012) (setting forth the requirements of a trust qualifying for the estate and gift tax marital deduction).

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property acquired during the marriage.²⁸⁸ For example, while the TUIA rules generally require an equitable split of mineral royalties between income and principal, for purposes of marital property characterization, such receipts are generally considered proceeds from, or a mutation of, the underlying land.²⁸⁹

Within this context, consider the application of the equitable interest theory—as pronounced in the *Sharma* opinion—to a situation in which the settlor expressly grants the trustee the discretion to allocate receipts between income and principal and distribute *either* income or principal (or both) to the beneficiary spouse.²⁹⁰ During a period when the trust assets generate \$100 of dividends and the trustee decides to distribute the \$100 to the beneficiary spouse, the trustee could either: (a) classify the \$100 in dividends as principal (rather than income); or (b) charge the entire distribution to principal.²⁹¹ Either way, the beneficiary spouse would have an equitable interest in trust principal but no interest in trust income. Thus, the trustee could unilaterally prevent what would otherwise constitute income (under both marital property and trust law)—the amount that is now in the hands of the beneficiary spouse—from being characterized as community property. Although the beneficiary spouse could conceivably claim that the *amount* distributed was insufficient, under the circumstances, it is unlikely that the beneficiary spouse could challenge the exercise of the trustee’s discretion when it comes to classifications of income and principal.²⁹² Furthermore, acting alone, the non-beneficiary spouse appears to lack the standing to challenge the exercise of the trustee’s discretion because even if the trust income was community in nature, it would also be subject to the beneficiary spouse’s sole management authority.²⁹³

288. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.176 (Thomson Reuters 2014).

289. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.174(a)(3), (d), (e) (Thomson Reuters 2014); *Norris v. Vaughan*, 260 S.W.2d 676, 679–80 (Tex. 1953). In the context of the federal income tax, the Fifth Circuit opted to apply the marital property characterization of oil and gas royalties. See *Comm’r v. Wilson*, 76 F.2d 766, 770 (5th Cir. 1935). The Texas courts have yet to consider the conflict between these two bodies of law.

290. See *supra* Part III.C.2.

291. In a discretionary trust such as this, the trustee has no fiduciary duty to maximize the production of income versus principal. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79, cmt. f, at 134 (2007).

292. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.006 (Thomson Reuters 2014); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87, at 242 (“When a trustee has discretion with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is subject to supervision by a court only to prevent abuse of discretion.”).

293. *Cleaver v. George Staton Co.*, 908 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, writ denied). At least one appellate court has allowed a non-beneficiary spouse to conduct discovery with respect to third party-settled spendthrift trusts over which the trustee had “sole discretion” to make distributions to the beneficiary spouse. See *Lucas v. Lucas*, 365 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1962, no writ). The beneficiary spouse was receiving annual amounts of \$35,000 to \$40,000 from the trust for several years that ceased since the petition for dissolution had been filed, and the beneficiary spouse filed a motion to reduce the amount payable in temporary alimony and child support be reduced to

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Generally speaking, the relevance of fiduciary accounting principles should be limited to determining *how much* a designated income beneficiary would receive where either: (a) income distributions are mandatory; or (b) discretionary distributions are expressly limited to income. Outside of these limited contexts, the application of fiduciary accounting principles is generally academic.²⁹⁴ By defining marital property rights in terms of mutable distinctions between principal and income, as the court in the *Benavides* case did, subverting the interests of the non-beneficiary spouse becomes little more than an exercise in form over substance for sophisticated settlors, trustees, and the lawyers who advise them.

IV. FACTORS AND NONFACTORS IN CHARACTERIZING TRUST INCOME

While Part III explained the three theoretical approaches that federal and Texas courts have adopted to characterize trust income from a separate

\$1,000 per month because of a purported lack of funds. *Id.* Said the court, “we think [the non-beneficiary spouse] would be entitled to inquire into the incomes of the various trusts and the amounts, regularity and time of support payments which have been made [to the beneficiary spouse] as beneficiary.” *Id.* Although the discovery request was not based on determining whether and to what extent the trust income constituted community property, the court appeared to leave open this possibility. *Id.* See also *Havens v. Lee*, 694 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).

294. That said, two commentators have advocated using fiduciary accounting principles to determine character of trust distributions, at least in the context of applying the conduit principle:

Such an approach is consistent with community property law, if it is accepted that trust property is neither community nor separate, but property of the trust. From this point of view, the collective rights of the beneficiary, viewed as an abstraction, are considered as the ‘property’ from which the income flows, and distributions are classified as community income when made out of income of the trust, as determined for trust accounting purposes, much as corporate dividends are community income when declared in cash or property out of accumulated corporate profits.

Branscomb & Miller, *supra* note 140, at 718. But as other commentators are keen to point out, a trust is not an entity like a corporation. See, e.g., Thomas M. Featherston, Jr., *Texas Family Property: Integrating Trusts & Estates & Marital Property Law*, 36 STATE BAR OF TEX., 32ND ANNUAL ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING & PROBATE COURSE, at 40 (2008). Although a board of directors can elect to pay a dividend, it has far less discretion to determine what constitutes “net assets” or “surplus” available for distribution than a trustee would have. Compare TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. § 21.314(a) (West 2012) with TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 116.004(a)(2), (b), 116.005 (Thomson Reuters 2014). Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and other objective methods of accounting mandated in the commercial context are far less flexible than the TUIA classifications, and a board’s deviation from these methods of accounting is far more likely to result in adverse consequences than a trustee’s deviation from the TUIA. See *generally* S.E.C. v. Caserta, 75 F.Supp.2d 79, 90-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing the role of GAAP in federal securities actions). For example, the Texas Trust Code grants a trustee broad discretion to make an allowance for depreciation. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.203 (Thomson Reuters 2014). By contrast, if a business enterprise fails to make an appropriate allowance for depreciation “contrary to commercial custom and usage,” it could be liable for “false and misleading” financial statements. See *Cameron v. First Nat’l Bank of Galveston*, 194 S.W. 469, 474 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1917, writ ref’d).

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property trust, Part IV explores how a number of different circumstances could potentially affect these characterizations under each of these different approaches.²⁹⁵

A. *The Identity of the Settlor and the Source of Trust Funds*

If a beneficiary spouse establishes and funds a trust with separate property, before or during the marriage, the doctrine of mutations dictates that the trust principal should remain the settlor's separate property.²⁹⁶ The issue relevant to this discussion is whether the characterization of income that those trust assets generate during the marriage is affected by the fact that the beneficiary spouse transferred the assets to the trust.

Several lower appellate courts have applied the no-greater-interest/present possessory interest rule to self-settled trusts, at least when the trustee had discretion to distribute income to the beneficiary spouse.²⁹⁷ As discussed later in this section, these opinions present several issues. Namely, by simply transferring the property to an irrevocable trust where the spouse retains the income interest, can a spouse change the character of trust income from separate property without the consent of the other spouse? By doing so, has the settlor spouse lost anything, or given anything away, in the process? Or does such a trust merely serve as a vehicle to do what the spouse could not otherwise do under the Texas constitution?

The *Mercantile National Bank* case also involved a self-settled trust, although nothing in the opinion explicitly linked this circumstance to the dicta adopting the conduit principle.²⁹⁸ In his support of the conduit principle, Professor Davis has argued that the Texas Supreme Court's rulings in *Herring* and in *Brown v. Lee* "clearly demonstrate that the community property system of Texas forms a pattern whereby constitutionally the property rights of the spouses are definitely fixed, and cannot be enlarged or diminished by legislative, judicial or contractual processes, even though the contractual process is attempted by means of a

295. See *infra* Part IV.

296. See *Ridgell v. Ridgell*, 960 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).

297. See *Lipsey v. Lipsey*, 983 S.W.2d 345, 347–51 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.); *Lemke v. Lemke*, 929 S.W.2d 662, 664–65 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied); *In re Marriage of Burns*, 573 S.W.2d 555, 556–58 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1978, writ dismissed); *Shepflin v. Small*, 23 S.W. 432, 433 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1893, no writ).

298. See *Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dall. v. Wilson*, 279 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1955, writ refused n.r.e.). The *Sharma* court distinguished the *Mercantile National Bank* case as involving a situation in which the beneficiary spouse, as both the sole settlor and the sole beneficiary, could not make a gift of the trust property to herself. *Sharma v. Routh*, 302 S.W.3d 355, 366 n.20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). Thus, no portion of the trust income could be considered separate property. *Id.*

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spendthrift discretionary trust.”²⁹⁹ As previously discussed, the application of the conduit principle unduly sacrifices all concerns for settlors’ legitimate property rights at the altar of a particular judicial interpretation of article XVI, section 15 of the constitution.³⁰⁰ As the settlor’s identity changes, however, Professor Davis’s argument becomes more persuasive.³⁰¹ Unlike the laws in Louisiana and Wisconsin, the Texas constitution does not allow a spouse to unilaterally change the character of income from separate property.³⁰² Therefore, a strong argument could be made that a spouse should not be able to fund a trust with her own separate property for her own benefit during the marriage, and by doing so, unilaterally change the nature of income that would otherwise be classified as community property into separate property.³⁰³

Other commentators suggest that if the beneficiary spouse is also the settlor, the other spouse “should be able to pierce the trust’s veil to establish the marital character of actual trust distributions or even the retained interest of the settlor/spouse.”³⁰⁴ However, in the absence of any facts giving rise to an alter ego claim, simply allowing a court to access all of the trust income could have the effect of subverting the settlor’s property right to determine her own beneficiaries without necessarily advancing the policies behind the marital property law.³⁰⁵

299. Davis, *supra* note 163, at 976. See *Brown v. Lee*, 371 S.W.2d 694, 699 (Tex. 1963). In the *Brown* case, the court ruled that where an insured-husband and beneficiary-wife died in a common disaster, the proceeds from the life insurance policies acquired with community funds constituted community property. *Id.* As such, one-half of the proceeds passed under the laws of descent and distribution to the wife’s heir, which was, under the statutes governing survival in the case of the simultaneous deaths of the insured and beneficiary of a life insurance policy, the estate of the insured husband. *Id.* at 696–97. Curiously enough (given Professor Davis’ position regarding the rule of implied exclusion), a majority of the court rejected the notion that its ruling ran afoul of the dictates of *Arnold* by allowing a statute to supersede the constitutional definitions of marital property. See *id.* at 697–98.

300. See *supra* Part III.B.2.

301. Note that the court in the *Wilmington Trust* case distinguished the *Mercantile National Bank* holding on the grounds that the trust in the latter case was self-settled and the settlor spouse “had an expectation of recapturing the corpus of the trust during her lifetime.” *Wilmington Trust Co. v. U.S.*, 4 Cl. Ct. 6, 11 (1983), *aff’d*, 753 F.2d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

302. See discussion *supra* Part II.A.3.

303. See *Ridgell*, 960 S.W.2d at 149.

304. Featherston & Springer, *supra* note 75, at 903. See *infra* Part IV.C. Although no party has ever made an alter ego claim in a Texas case involving a self-settled trust, the courts have mentioned that such a claim could theoretically exist with the appropriate facts. See *Lemke*, 929 S.W.2d at 664; *Burns*, 573 S.W.2d at 556.

305. In this regard, a spouse is free to give away her separate property without the consent of the other spouse even if it has the potential to generate income that would belong to the community. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.101 (West 2006); *Bohn v. Bohn*, 455 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ dismissed). By the same token, the interests of third party beneficiaries in a trust funded with separate property for which the settlor spouse has no present possessory right should not be infringed in the interest of protecting the community estate. See *supra* Part II.C. Rather, a remedy that balances the legitimate interests of marital property law and trust law should simply prevent the settlor—** Author’s revised draft (June 1, 2018) of article originally published at 5 ESTATE PLANNING & COMMUNITY PROPERTY L.J. 217 (2013).

B. The Powers of the Spouse as Beneficiary

Under the no-greater-interest/present possessory interest rule, the assets of a revocable trust, over which the settlor spouse clearly holds a possessory right, would be characterized as her separate property, and all income from the trust would be characterized as community property.³⁰⁶ The same is true of an irrevocable trust over which the beneficiary spouse holds a “general power of appointment,” or more specifically, the power to appoint trust property to herself.³⁰⁷ This is essentially the same present possessory right—the right would allow the beneficiary spouse to withdraw half of the trust assets at the age of thirty—that the court in *Long* discussed.³⁰⁸ It is also common for a trust instrument to grant a beneficiary “Crummey” rights that allow the beneficiary to withdraw the lesser of the amount that a third party gifts to the trust or the amount of the third party’s available annual gift tax exclusion.³⁰⁹ Arguably, income that the trust earns from the property subject to the power during the time that the right is exercisable should also be characterized as community property.

The *Long* court did not address what would happen if the beneficiary spouse’s present possessory right expired before the beneficiary spouse exercised that right. For federal gift tax purposes, the lapse of a general power of appointment by a beneficiary spouse may be considered a gift by the beneficiary spouse back to the trust.³¹⁰ Although a Texas statute provides that a beneficiary does not become a settlor of a trust merely because that beneficiary holds certain general powers of appointment or because that beneficiary allows such powers to lapse, the statute’s

spouse from having her cake and eating it too—receiving the benefit of income earned during the marriage from separate property while maintaining its character as separate property. See *infra* Part V.

306. See *supra* Part III.A.2. In this regard, a certain degree of caution is appropriate for spouses who move to Texas with separate revocable trusts that generate income intended to be each settlor spouse’s own separate property. An express agreement between the spouses that meets constitutional requirements is the best resolution for this problem. See *supra* Part II.A.1.

307. See *supra* Part III.A.2. For federal estate and gift tax purposes, a beneficiary holds a general power of appointment over any portion of a trust that the beneficiary may appoint to herself, her estate, her creditors, or the creditors of her estate, resulting in an inclusion of the assets subject to the power in the beneficiary’s taxable estate if the beneficiary still holds the power upon her death or a taxable gift if the power is exercised for another person or released during the beneficiary’s lifetime. See I.R.C. §§ 2041, 2514 (West 2012). However, as an exception to the statutory rule, a general power of appointment over assets constituting no more than the greater of 5% of the value of the trust assets or \$5,000 may lapse without estate or gift tax consequences. See I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(2), 2514(e).

308. See *In re Marriage of Long*, 542 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ).

309. See *Crummey v. Comm’r*, 397 F.2d 82, 87–88 (9th Cir. 1968); Georgiana J. Slade, *Personal Life Insurance Trusts*, 807-2ND TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) at A-11 (2009). In some cases, these rights expire within some fixed period after making a gift to the trust (e.g., thirty days), and in other cases, *Crummey* rights may “hang” on for longer periods as is necessary for avoidance of adverse estate and gift tax consequences to the beneficiary. See Slade at A-17–19.

310. See Slade, *supra* note 309, at A-17.

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applicability is limited to determining whether the beneficiary's exposure to creditor claims is proper.³¹¹

C. The Identity of the Trustee

In the relatively few reported cases in which the court mentions that the beneficiary spouse served as the trustee of a separate property trust, the circumstance was not dispositive.³¹² In the *Sharma* case, the court merely noted that “[the non-beneficiary spouse] did not allege, and [she] does not assert on appeal, that the trusts were created, funded, or operated in fraud of her rights, nor has she pleaded that the trusts should be disregarded or that the trusts are [the beneficiary spouse’s] alter egos.”³¹³ That said, the opinion does not discuss how these claims might apply in the context of a trust relationship.³¹⁴

The only situation in which the fraud on the spouse claim can apply is when a spouse gratuitously transfers her sole-management community property to a third party with the actual intent to deprive the other spouse of the use and enjoyment of the assets or to the extent that the amount transferred is capricious or excessive.³¹⁵ Under the Texas permutation of the Spanish rule, the fraud on the spouse claim does not apply to transfers of separate property despite the fact that all separate property has the potential to generate community income.³¹⁶ As such, in the context of a separate property trust, a claim of fraud on the non-beneficiary spouse would be necessarily limited to challenging the exercise of the trustee spouse’s discretion *not* to make distributions of trust income to herself, thus allowing the income to pass to the other trust beneficiaries.

The alter ego theory generally allows a trial court to pierce the veil of the corporate form, and this theory holds individuals liable for corporate debt when “it appears that the individuals are using the corporate entity as a sham to perpetrate a fraud, to avoid personal liability, avoid the effect of a

311. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(d), (e)(2), (f)(3) (Thomson Reuters 2014 & Supp. 2017).

312. See, e.g., *Sharma v. Routh*, 302 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

313. *Id.* at 366.

314. Although it is difficult to imagine how claims of fraud on the spouse or the alter ego theory could apply when the beneficiary spouse has no formal authority over the trust assets, two appellate courts mentioned these claims in the context in which the beneficiary spouse was not the trustee. See *In re Marriage of Burns*, 573 S.W.2d 555, 556–67 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1978, writ dismissed); *Lemke v. Lemke*, 929 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).

315. See *Horlock v. Horlock*, 533 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dismissed w.o.j.); *Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 480 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1972, writ refused n.r.e.) superseded by statute, Act of June 6, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 242, § 11.03, 1991 TEX. GEN. LAWS 1043–45 (current version at TEX. INS. CODE §§ 542.051–.061).

316. See *Givens*, 480 S.W.2d at 424–26.

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statute, or in a few other exceptional situations.”³¹⁷ In the context of divorce, the alter ego theory provides an equitable remedy independent of the right of reimbursement for the community to directly characterize corporate assets as part of the community estate.³¹⁸ Although a Texas trust is a relationship between legal and equitable owners of property and not an entity, the courts often fail to appreciate the difference.³¹⁹ That said, assuming that the applicable trust analogs for a shareholder and for an officer or director of a corporation are the beneficiary and the trustee, respectively, the non-beneficiary spouse must establish the following: “(1) unity between the separate property [trust] and the [beneficiary] spouse such that the separateness of the [trust] has ceased to exist, and (2) the [beneficiary] spouse’s improper use of the [trust] damaged the community estate beyond that which might be remedied by a claim for reimbursement.”³²⁰ Thus, based on the cases involving corporations, the mere fact that one spouse is both the sole trustee and the sole beneficiary is not sufficient to support an alter ego claim.³²¹ Even if the beneficiary spouse acts as the trustee and uses the trust funds like her own personal pocketbook, the non-beneficiary spouse must demonstrate a loss to the community, such as a lack of compensation for services provided as trustee.³²²

D. Mandatory Versus Discretionary Distributions and the Naked Income Interest

Some commentators are tempted to oversimplify the characterization of trust income from a separate property trust on the basis of whether the trustee *must* distribute the income to the beneficiary spouse during the

317. *Torregrossa v. Szelc*, 603 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex. 1980) (quoting *Pace Corp. v. Jackson*, 284 S.W.2d 340, 351 (Tex. 1995)). *See generally* *Castleberry v. Branscum*, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986).

318. *See* *Zisblatt v. Zisblatt*, 693 S.W.2d 944, 952 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ dismissed).

319. *See* *Burns*, 573 S.W.2d at 557 (referring to the eight trusts as “entities”); Orsinger & Zuflacht, *supra* note 265, at 13.

320. *Lifshutz v. Lifshutz*, 61 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (alterations supplied) (citations omitted). *See also* *Robbins v. Robbins*, 727 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1987, writ refused n.r.e.); *Zisblatt*, 693 S.W.2d at 950–51.

321. *See* *Robbins*, 727 S.W.2d at 747; *Goetz v. Goetz*, 567 S.W.2d 892, 896 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1976, no writ). In the corporate context, a successful alter ego claim often involves the underpayment of salary or other diversions of personal time and efforts towards enhancing the value of corporate separate property. *See, e.g.,* *Young v. Young*, 168 S.W.3d 276, 282–83 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).

322. *See* *Lifshutz*, 61 S.W.3d at 518. Under the equitable interest theories espoused in the *Ridgell* and *Sharma* opinions, it is at least conceivable that the non-beneficiary spouse could assert that the beneficiary spouse failed to exercise its discretion as trustee in a manner that would result in the distribution of community income. *See* *Sharma v. Routh*, 302 S.W.3d 355, 361–62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.); *Ridgell v. Ridgell*, 960 S.W.2d 144, 147–50 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).

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marriage.³²³ However, as discussed above, the Texas case law demands more nuanced considerations. By what means is an income interest in a trust acquired for marital property characterization purposes? Does a beneficiary spouse acquire trust income when the property transfers to the trust and the spouse becomes a beneficiary? Or is trust income acquired only when it is earned? Or, in the case of a discretionary trust, is trust income acquired only when the trustee exercises discretion to make a distribution to the beneficiary spouse? Is *when* even the right question to ask? Perhaps, *how* is the more relevant question.

Under the no-greater-interest/present possessory right rule, the question of timing of acquisition of property for marital property law purposes is distinct from the question of how acquisition occurs. In other words, acquisition occurs when the beneficiary spouse actually or constructively receives the trust property or income; but if the trust was funded prior to marriage or funded by gift, the *means* of acquiring the trust income is the same regardless of the timing.³²⁴ Thus, the difference between mandatory and discretionary provisions is relevant only after, and to the extent that, the beneficiary spouse has acquired the unfettered right to possess the property that generated the trust income.

Under the conduit principle, the beneficiary spouse is treated as the true owner of the underlying trust property.³²⁵ In this regard, the *Sharma* court made the following observation:

[T]hough the *Arnold* case did not involve trust income or a devise or gift of income, the *Arnold* court suggested that, if a spouse owns the property that generates income during the marriage, then the income results from the ownership of the property rather than any gift or devise that may have bestowed the income-generating property on the spouse in the past.³²⁶

Although the *Sharma* court did not adopt the conduit principle, the court's reasoning seems to be particularly applicable to the conduit principle. The timing and means of acquisition are both tied to the generation of income by the trust property, and the standard for distribution—whether mandatory or discretionary—appears to be irrelevant.³²⁷

323. See, e.g., LEOPOLD, *supra* note 32, § 6.11 (“Under general principles of Texas law, all income from a trust consisting of separate property which must be paid to a spouse during the marriage is community property.”).

324. See *Cleaver v. Cleaver*, 935 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no writ) (“[The beneficiary spouse’s] income from the trust is her separate property because her interest was established before her marriage and was conveyed by gift or devise.”).

325. See *supra* Part III.B.1.

326. *Sharma v. Routh*, 302 S.W.3d 355, 361–62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

327. In support of this contention, Professor Davis cited *Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle*, a case that involved a creditor claim against cotton grown on the wife’s separate land pursuant to a contract
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In the context of the equitable interest theory, addressing these questions becomes more complicated. For the equitable interest theory to apply in such a way that any trust income could ever be classified as community property, one must necessarily reject the notion that an income interest in a trust can be acquired by the same means that, and at the time when, the spouse first becomes a beneficiary.³²⁸ This assumption is not without valid criticisms – namely, why is an interest in income any less of a property right than an interest in trust principal? Generally speaking, when a settlor funds the trust and a spouse becomes a beneficiary, she receives a bundle of rights that are enforceable against the trustee, including the right (albeit limited) to compel the trustee to make the property productive of income.³²⁹ Notwithstanding the fact that the income has not yet been earned when the beneficiary acquires an interest in the trust, why is it necessary to unbundle these rights and parse the equitable interests between principal and income?

To characterize trust income as community property as it is earned, one must necessarily take the position that such income was, in fact, generated from property the spouse already acquired.³³⁰ Under the equitable interest theory, this property right is an equitable interest in principal.³³¹ However, in the context of a naked income interest—where the beneficiary spouse can never receive any of the underlying trust property—this basis for characterizing trust income falls apart.

In the early income tax cases, both the Fifth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court simply presumed from the existence of an income interest there was always some underlying interest in the trust property.³³² Prior to a Texas constitutional amendment that specifically addressed the character of income from interspousal gifts, the Fifth Circuit maintained

executed by her husband and distinguished between the management and ownership rights of the spouses. *Gohman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle*, 273 S.W. 808, 809 (1925). That is, even though a spouse may have sole rights of management and control over certain community income, the income still belongs to the community. *See id.* Professor Davis views this opinion as “authority for the principle that although a trustee may have exclusive control of income arising from the corpus of a trust during marriage the fact of such control does not change the status of the income as community property.” Davis, *supra* note 163, at 902, 975. To be sure, certain opinion imply that the spouse who holds management rights over community property acts as “trustee” for the other. *See Howard v. Commonwealth Bldg. & Loan Ass’n*, 94 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Comm’n. App. 1936). But to compare the duties that a managing spouse owes to the other spouse under Texas marital property law to all of the powers and duties that all trustees owe under all trusts is dubious at best. With respect to separate property, no spouse owes any duties to the other spouse. *Cleaver*, 935 S.W.2d at 496. Unlike the general fiduciary duty of a trustee, a spouse may simply choose to make the separate property unproductive. *See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 117.004(c)(5), (7)* (Thomson Reuters 2014)

328. *See Branscomb & Miller, supra* note 140, at 713.

329. *See supra* Part II.B.

330. *See supra* Part III.C.

331. *See id.*

332. *See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.176* (Thomson Reuters 2014). *See also supra* Part III.C.I.

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this position in the context of the federal estate tax.³³³ With respect to naked income interests, however, the United States Claims Court and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals came to a contrary conclusion in the *Wilmington Trust* case.³³⁴ These courts recognized that because the beneficiary spouse never acquired any interest in the trust principal, the principal never became the beneficiary spouse's separate property, and thus, such trust income could never be classified as community property.³³⁵ Although some commentators have suggested that the *Wilmington Trust* decision ended the debate, only one Texas appellate court has ruled upon the characterization of a naked income interest.³³⁶ In any case, it is clear that this result would be the same under the permutation of the equitable interest theory that the courts in *Ridgell* and *Sharma* both applied.³³⁷ That is, to characterize trust income as community property, the beneficiary spouse must have some actual interest in principal.³³⁸

Nonetheless, other commentators have suggested that courts should distinguish between mandatory and discretionary standards for distributions of income when it comes to marital property characterization.

A better approach to the resolution of the issue is to focus on the nature of the interest of the spouse/beneficiary in the trust. A spouse/beneficiary who has a mandatory interest in the income (i.e., the income must be paid on a periodic basis to the beneficiary) has an interest in the trust very similar to a life tenant's interest; accordingly, income distributed to a spouse/beneficiary pursuant to a mandatory income interest should be

333. *Wyly v. Comm'r*, 610 F.2d 1282, 1289 (5th Cir. 1980).

334. *Wilmington Trust Co. v. U.S.*, 4 Cl. Ct. 6, 14 (1983), *aff'd*, 753 F.2d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

335. *See id.*

336. Featherston & Springer, *supra* note 75, at 902. *Cleaver v. Cleaver* involved a testamentary trust established for the benefit of a wife when she was thirteen years old. *Cleaver v. Cleaver*, 935 S.W.2d 491, 492–93 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.). Approximately two years into the marriage, the wife attained the age of twenty-one and became eligible to receive mandatory distributions of income, with her children to receive the remainder upon her death. *Id.* However, the third-party trustee was also the manager of several business interests held as part of the trust estate and made scant dividends or other disbursements from the business entities during the marriage. *Id.* at 493. As a result, upon divorce, the characterization issues centered on the undistributed income of the businesses. *See id.* at 496. Because the husband conceded that the wife's interest as a beneficiary of the trust was her separate property received prior to marriage, the court never actually ruled upon the issue of whether a naked income interest constitutes community property. *Id.* at 493–94. Rather, the court applied the present possessory interest rule set forth in the *Long* opinion and held that to the extent that the wife earned the dividends but did not receive them at the time of the divorce, the wife held a present possessory interest in the trust property, and the trust income that was generated from those undistributed dividends would constitute community property. *Id.* at 496.

337. *See supra* Part III.C.2.

338. *Sharma*. 302 S.W.3d at 372. In this respect, the *Sharma* court makes a rather curious distinction: whereas an interest in the income of a trust established by a third party can only be acquired by gift or devise, an interest in both the income and the principal of a trust established by a third party can be acquired by some other means. *Id.* at 361–62.

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community property. However, if the spouse/beneficiary has a discretionary interest in the trust's income, the income distributed in the discretion of the trustee should have a separate character like a gift.³³⁹

That is, in the context of a discretionary income interest, the trustee should be considered the real donor, and as such, the beneficiary may not acquire the property by gift until the trustee actually chooses to make a distribution.³⁴⁰ But in the context of a third party-settled trust, regardless of who the donor is and when the trust earns income, these distinguishing assertions fail to address one critical question: how is a mandatory income interest any more or less acquired by gift than a discretionary income interest? Even if one considers the trustee's exercise of discretion as the completion of a gift by the settlor, the ultimate means of acquisition still lies in the original trust instrument, regardless of whether distributions are mandatory or discretionary.³⁴¹

E. Distributed Versus Undistributed Income

Under the no-greater-interest/present possessory right rule, the marital property characterization of the beneficiary spouse's interest in trust income does not depend on whether the trustee actually makes a distribution to beneficiary spouse.³⁴² Rather, to the extent (and only to the extent) that the beneficiary spouse has an unfettered right to the underlying trust assets, the income that is generated from such assets would be considered community property regardless of whether the trustee distributes it or not.³⁴³

Under the conduit principle, whether the trustee distributes the trust income is irrelevant. Because the beneficiary spouse is considered the true owner of the trust property, the trust income would always be considered community property.³⁴⁴ This aspect highlights the most significant criticism of the conduit principle – that is, permitting the non-beneficiary spouse to invade the trust to acquire the undistributed income could damage the interests of non-spouse beneficiaries who could be entitled to such

339. Featherston & Springer, *supra* note 75, at 902. The notion that the trustee of the discretionary trust,

340. Counts, *supra* note 207, at 916–17. *But see* Branscomb & Miller, *supra* note 140, at 714 (adopting a rule that distinguishes between mandatory and discretionary income interests necessarily “create[s] a difficult problem of determining in each particular case whether the degree of discretion over trust distributions is sufficient to preclude a community character for the distributions”).

341. *See* GERRY W. BEYER, TEXAS TRUST LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2d ed. 2007) (“[T]he payments made to or for the benefit of the beneficiary must be consistent with the instructions in the trust instrument.”).

342. *See* McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350, 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd).

343. *See In re Marriage of Long*, 542 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ).

344. *See supra* Part III.B; Branscomb & Miller, *supra* note 140, at 722.

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income and subverts the settlor's rights to designate who benefits from the trust property and how.³⁴⁵ If the beneficiary spouse did not receive any benefit and is not unconditionally entitled to receive a benefit from the trust income, then the non-beneficiary spouse has little to complain about in any equitable sense.³⁴⁶ That said, as discussed above, this criticism of the conduit principle is far less persuasive when the beneficiary spouse is also the settlor.³⁴⁷

Under the equitable interest theory applied by the *Ridgell* and *Sharma* courts, it would appear that only the trust income that is distributed to the beneficiary spouse could be classified as community property, at least when a spendthrift trust is involved.³⁴⁸ To be sure, the language of the *Ridgell* opinion is somewhat ambiguous on this point, and the *Sharma* court only ruled upon the characterization of distributed trust income.³⁴⁹ But what distinguishes this permutation of the equitable interest theory from the conduit approach is that under the former, the mere earning of income within the trust is the not the equivalent of the beneficiary spouse's acquisition of income.³⁵⁰ Rather, only the income that the trustee distributes during the marriage is considered acquired during the marriage, provided the beneficiary spouse had the requisite interest in trust principal.³⁵¹

345. See *supra* note 207 and accompanying text.

346. For the same reasons, the courts will protect the undistributed interest of a beneficiary in a spendthrift trust from the beneficiary's own creditors—at least where the beneficiary has not funded the trust. See *Parscal v. Parscal*, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1102–03 (1983). As one appellate court has noted:

The doctrine that property may be made inalienable by such declaration of [a spendthrift] trust rests upon the theory that a donor has the right to give his property to another upon any conditions which he sees fit to impose, and that, inasmuch as such a gift takes nothing from the prior or subsequent creditors of the beneficiary to which they previously had the right to look for payment, they cannot complain that the donor has provided that the property or income shall go or be paid personally to the beneficiary and shall not be subject to the claims of creditors.

Id. at 1100. See also *Nichols v. Eaton*, 91 U.S. 716, 727 (1875) (“Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property in securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills of life, the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived.”).

347. See *supra* Part IV.A. See also *Parscal*, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 1103.

348. See *supra* Part III.C.2.

349. See *id.* See also *Sharma v. Routh*, 302 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

350. See *supra* Part III.C.

351. See *id.* Whether trust income is distributed or not may be irrelevant under an equitable interest theory if the law considers the interest in the trust income as property the beneficiary acquired by gift or devise and thus, always separate property in the context of a third party-settled trust. See *supra* note 212 and accompanying text.

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F. Spendthrift Provision

If a court purports to recognize a settlor's property right to designate who is and who is not a beneficiary of a trust, it would follow that the same court would also honor a spendthrift provision to protect a beneficiary's interests from the claims of any party who is not a beneficiary, including the spouse of a beneficiary. Unfortunately, most of the reported cases that mention the presence or the absence of a spendthrift provision neglect to articulate how this aspect would make a difference when characterizing trust income.³⁵²

In holding that a non-beneficiary spouse could not reach the undistributed income of a third party-settled trust in the context of a divorce, the *McClelland* court pointed out that the will in question had in effect created a spendthrift trust.³⁵³ Although there was no explicit connection made in that opinion, the presence of the spendthrift provision—prohibiting beneficiary spouses from assigning or transferring their beneficial interests—would certainly be relevant if the test for characterizing trust income was premised on the notion that the non-beneficiary spouse could have no greater interest than that of the beneficiary spouse.³⁵⁴

Under the conduit principle, the existence of a spendthrift provision appears to have no effect on the character of trust income. Citing *Herring v. Blakeley*, Professor Davis summarily argued that because the non-beneficiary spouse does not stand in the position of a creditor, the non-beneficiary spouse's community property rights are not affected.³⁵⁵

In the federal income tax cases adopting a presumptive equitable interest theory, the Fifth Circuit observed that, assuming *arguendo* that a settlor *could* unilaterally characterize trust income as separate property within the terms of the trust, “[t]here is nothing in the fact that a trust is a spendthrift trust designed to protect property from creditors and from alienation by the beneficiary from which such an inference or implication could be drawn.”³⁵⁶ In contrast with *McClelland*, the federal income tax

352. See *In re Marriage of Burns*, 573 S.W.2d 555, 556–67 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1978, writ dismissed); *Buckler v. Buckler*, 424 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1967, writ dismissed); *Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Wilson*, 279 S.W.2d 650, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1995, writ refused); *Wilmington Trust Co. v. U.S.*, 4 Cl. Ct. 6, 8 (1983), *aff'd*, 753 F.2d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Indeed, the only two courts that have expressly considered the characterization of income from both spendthrift trusts and non-spendthrift trusts made no distinction between the two. *Burns*, 573 S.W.2d at 556–57; *Wilmington Trust Co.*, 4 Cl. Ct. at 8.

353. *McClelland v. McClelland*, 37 S.W. 350, 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ refused).

354. See *id.*

355. See Davis, *supra* note 163, at 978.

356. *Comm'r v. Porter*, 148 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1945). See also *Comm'r v. Sims*, 148 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1945).

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cases suggest that the efficacy of a spendthrift protection clause is dependent upon whether the trustee distributed the income in question.³⁵⁷ In *Ridgell*, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals adopted the same position.³⁵⁸ On the other hand, the *Lemke* court found that because the spendthrift provision ultimately limited the right of the beneficiary spouse to possess the trust income and principal; and since the trustee had discretion to make distributions, the undistributed trust income could not be classified as community property.³⁵⁹

In any event, no court has treated the non-beneficiary spouse like a creditor of the beneficiary spouse in the context of a spendthrift trust; rather, the courts have considered how the spendthrift provision affected the beneficiary spouse's rights to the trust income and the trust principal.³⁶⁰ In this regard, at least with respect to the no-greater-interest/present possessory right rule, the *absence* of a spendthrift provision could conceivably be relevant. That is, if a beneficiary spouse could transfer her beneficial interest for value to a third party, then the argument could be made that she holds a present possessory right.

G. Expressions of the Settlor's Intent

Under Texas law, a third-party donor cannot create community property by making a gift to a married couple.³⁶¹ But can a third-party settlor change the marital property characterization of a trust income by including express provisions to that effect within the trust? Under the current law, the answer is unclear, but such language certainly could not hurt.³⁶²

In characterizing trust income in the context of divorce, the *McClelland* court noted the following:

It is not the purpose and object of the statutes that create the community interest of husband and wife in property to prevent a testator from making a disposition of his property to either upon conditions and trusts [that] limit the right of the beneficiary, or restrict his interest to a limited extent, and define what its character shall be. This is the right of the testator. The

357. See *Porter*, 148 F.2d at 568–69. See also *McClelland*, 37 S.W. at 358.

358. *Ridgell v. Ridgell*, 960 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).

359. *Lemke v. Lemke*, 929 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). However, *Lemke* involved self-settled trusts. See *id.* at 663. As such, the income and assets of the trust would not have been protected from the claims of the creditors of the beneficiary spouse. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(d) (Thomson Reuters 2014 & Supp. 2017).

360. See *Davis*, *supra* note 163, at 978.

361. See *Jones v. Jones*, 804 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1991, no writ).

362. See *SPEER & OAKES*, *supra* note 53, § 451, at 32–33 (illustrating an example of language a settlor should include in the terms of a trust).

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law did not impose upon him the duty of devising and bequeathing his property to his son, and when he elected to do so he had the authority to determine what interest in his estate the son should enjoy; and, having defined this interest, the wife, by force of community statutes, could not exceed and extend it.³⁶³

However, some commentators have since asserted that the Texas Supreme Court overruled this aspect of the *McClelland* opinion.³⁶⁴ Specifically, the court in *Arnold* effectively prohibited private parties from altering the character of community property through “contractual processes” except those specifically authorized by the Texas constitution.³⁶⁵

In any case, the no-greater-interest/present possessory right rule implicitly recognizes that a non-beneficiary spouse is not intended to be a trust beneficiary unless the terms provide otherwise.³⁶⁶ A non-beneficiary spouse can only earn trust income from trust property that the beneficiary spouse acquired, either actually or constructively.³⁶⁷

Because the conduit principle disregards the trust relationship to expand the scope of marital property to the undistributed income of the trust, it is unlikely that any expression of the settlor’s intent within the trust instrument would be relevant to a court’s analysis. In *Mercantile National Bank*, the only case with language that supports the conduit principle, the trust did not contain a provision regarding the characterization of income, although the court did note that the trustee could not play accounting games with accumulated income to avoid characterization as community property.³⁶⁸

In contrast, certain courts that have adopted the equitable interest theory have noted the importance of the settlor’s intent. In the *Porter* case, a federal court opined that Texas courts would probably allow the settlor to effectively dictate the marital property character of trust income under the express terms of the trust.³⁶⁹ And in a case of the proverbial horse following the cart, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals cited the *Porter* opinion to intimate that the express terms of the trust *could* be determinative of the characterization of trust income.³⁷⁰ Even so, “the

363. *McClelland v. McClelland*, 37 S.W. 350, 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref’d). See *Branscomb & Miller*, *supra* note 140, at 723–25. See generally *Sullivan v. Skinner*, 66 S.W. 680 (considering a bequest to the wife “for her sole and separate use”).

364. See *Branscomb & Miller*, *supra* note 140, at 723.

365. See *Davis*, *supra* note 163, at 976.

366. See *McClelland*, 37 S.W. at 358.

367. See *id.*

368. See *Mercantile Nat’l Bank v. Wilson*, 279 S.W.2d 650, 659–60 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1995, writ ref’d).

369. See *Comm’r v. Porter*, 148 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1945).

370. *Ridgell v. Ridgell*, 960 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).

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[trust] instrument must, in the most precise and definite way, and by the use of language of unmistakable intent, make that desire and intention clear.”³⁷¹

V. DEVELOPING A CONSISTENT AND COHERENT APPROACH

The inconsistencies between the three approaches the courts have set forth to characterize trust income as either community or separate property reflects a larger problem. That is, the courts’ articulations of these approaches give very little consideration to the threshold questions of whether, and under what circumstances, the principles of marital property law can and should be applied in concert with the principles of trust law.³⁷² The final portion of this article proposes how Texas courts could develop rules to balance these two areas of property law and provide a consistent and coherent set of guidelines for spouses, settlors, and trustees.³⁷³

At least one commentator has observed that because marital property law is expressly set forth in the Texas constitution and trust law is not, the former should simply trump the latter.³⁷⁴ But the explicit mention of marital property within the constitution is not the end of the story, as the Texas Supreme Court has recognized.

There is another constitutional problem. The protection of one’s right to own property is said to be one of the most important purposes of government. That right has been described as fundamental, natural, inherent, inalienable, not derived from the legislature and as preexisting even constitutions. Article I, section 19, of the Texas Constitution explains that no citizen of this state shall be deprived of his property except by the due course of the law of the land. The due course that protects citizens requires not only procedural but also substantive due course.³⁷⁵

As a substantive constitutional right, “[o]ne person’s property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public

371. See *Porter*, 148 F.2d at 568. See also *Ridgell*, 960 S.W. at 149; *Estate of Hinds v. Comm’r*, 11 T.C. 314, 322–23 (1948).

372. See *id.*

373. Several commentators have articulated well-reasoned criticisms of, and alternatives to, civil law characterizations of community and separate property on death and divorce. See, e.g., Shari Motro, *Labor, Luck, and Love: Reconsidering the Sanctity of Separate Property*, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1623 (2008); Carolyn J. Frontz & Hanoch Dagan, *Properties of Marriage*, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75 (2004). However, this article does not address the extent to which the Texas version of Spanish civil law broadly accomplishes its purported objectives in the twenty-first century. In the absence of significant constitutional change, it is unlikely that Texas courts will alter the current marital property scheme. See *Cameron v. Cameron*, 641 S.W.2d 210, 218–19 (Tex. 1982).

374. See *Davis*, *supra* note 163, at 976.

375. *Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer*, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977) (citations omitted).

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purpose, even though compensation be paid.”³⁷⁶ Thus, for example, although courts may order parents to pay child support out of their separate property, courts may not compel parents to transfer separate property to their spouse.³⁷⁷ It should follow that if a spouse’s beneficial interest in a trust is separate property, there is a constitutional interest in protecting it that is no more or less significant than the spouses’ interest protecting in community property.³⁷⁸

Furthermore, the fact that article XVI, section 15 of the Texas constitution makes no mention of trusts is entirely consistent with the original intent to merely carve out an exception to the common law with respect to marital property rights.³⁷⁹ Indeed, the assertion that marital property law trumps trust law only begs the following question: when, and to what extent, is a beneficial interest in a trust considered “property” that is considered “owned,” “claimed,” or “acquired” by a spouse within the meaning of the Texas constitution?³⁸⁰

Finally, although the discussion is conspicuously absent from most of the relevant opinions to date, the courts must consider a settlor’s property rights. The Texas Supreme Court considers a person’s right to dispose of property as she sees fit to be inviolate:

Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment *and disposal*. Anything which destroys any of these elements of property, to that extent destroys the property itself. . . . The right to acquire and own property, *and to deal with it and use it as the owner chooses*, so long as the use harms nobody, is a natural right. It does not owe its origins to constitutions. It existed before them.³⁸¹

These property rights should extend to one’s right to transfer property in trust—the right to determine *who* will benefit from the property, *when*, and *how*. It seems axiomatic that if a settlor does not expressly designate a person as a beneficiary (for example, a non-beneficiary spouse), then that person should not be able to benefit from the trust or be permitted to enforce the trust against the trustee.³⁸² As a general rule of trust law, a

376. *Id.* at 140–41 (quoting *Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp.*, 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1936)).

377. *See id.* at 142; *Cameron*, 614 S.W.2d at 218–19.

378. *See Eggeneyer*, 554 S.W.2d at 140–41; *Cameron*, 614 S.W.2d at 218–19.

379. *See* notes 39–42 and accompanying text.

380. *See* TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.

381. *Spann v. Dall.*, 235 S.W. 513, 514–15 (Tex. 1921) (emphasis supplied).

382. *See* RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 126, 200 (1959). However, a court could find that the settlor intended a distributive standard such as “support” to include the dependents of a beneficiary. *See* 1A AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 157.1, at 190–91 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter SCOTT & FRATCHER ON TRUSTS].

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settlor has a right to dictate the use, enjoyment, and disposition of her property, and such right is circumscribed only when the purpose of the trust is illegal or the terms of the trust would otherwise require the trustee to commit an act that is criminal, tortious, or contrary to public policy.³⁸³ And the public policy exception is not applied lightly, even when the protected interest is that of the spouse of a beneficiary.³⁸⁴

Within this conceptual framework, the remainder of this article proposes two alternative approaches that both attempt to balance the interests of settlors, beneficiaries, and spouses of beneficiaries more effectively. That said, the first approach—a permutation of the present possessory interest rule with an exception for self-settled trusts—leans toward the interests of protecting the settlor’s property rights and a more expansive definition of a beneficiary spouse’s separate property, and the second approach—a modified application of the conduit principle—leans toward the interests of the non-beneficiary spouse and a more expansive definition of community property.³⁸⁵

While the law rarely if ever strikes a perfect balance of competing interests, either of these two alternative approaches would represent an improvement over the current manifestations of the no-greater-interest/present possessory right rule, the conduit principle, and the equitable interest theory applied by the Texas courts. In its current form, the no-greater-interest/present possessory interest rule offers an undue opportunity for a spouse to unilaterally convert income from separate property into separate property without necessarily losing the benefit of that income.³⁸⁶ The pure conduit principle reflects no balancing of interests – that is, by allowing a non-beneficiary spouse to reach the undistributed income of a trust without regard to whether the beneficiary spouse will benefit from that income, there is no consideration for the property rights of the settlor or the other trust beneficiaries.³⁸⁷ The equitable interest theory, as articulated by the Texas courts, would likely produce outcomes that are,

383. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.031 (Thomson Reuters 2014); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62 cmt. k (1959).

384. See SCOTT & FRATCHER ON TRUSTS, *supra* note 382, § 62, at 282 (“It seems to me extremely dangerous to limit the power of disposition on any general notion of impolicy, without some definite rule or principle being shown to apply to the case.”) (quoting *Egerton v. Earl Brownlow*, 4 H.L.C. 1, 68, 70 (1853)). See also, e.g., *Erickson v. Erickson*, 266 N.W. 161, 164 (Minn. 1936), *reh’g denied*, 267 N.W. 426, 427 (1936) (holding that the interests of providing a spouse with alimony from the beneficiary spouse should not “transcend the right of the donor to do as he pleases with his own property and to choose the object of his bounty” in the absence of “some justifiable interpretation of the donor’s language”).

385. See *infra* Parts V.A and V.B.

386. See *supra* notes 302–303 and accompanying text.

387. See *supra* note 207 and accompanying text.

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at best, arbitrary in reflecting economic reality, and at worst, unduly susceptible to manipulation by settlors and trustees.³⁸⁸

A. The Present Possessory Interest Rule with a Self-Settled Marital Trust Exception

Under the no-greater-interest/present possessory interest rule, trust income from a separate property trust is characterized as community property only from the time, and only to the extent, that the beneficiary spouse has received an actual or a constructive possessory interest in the trust property.³⁸⁹ Notwithstanding the perfunctory and strained readings of the *Long* opinion by other courts, the present possessory interest rule is relatively easy to apply and understand.³⁹⁰ The continued application of this rule would be consistent with the Texas Supreme Court's only unequivocal opinion that relates to these issues and a majority of the lower appellate court opinions.³⁹¹

The present possessory interest rule is premised upon the notion that a spouse cannot acquire property—whether community or separate—until the spouse has an unfettered right to possession.³⁹² As previously discussed, critics of this rule assert that, based upon a series of retirement benefit cases decided by the Texas Supreme Court, a right to possession is not a necessary condition for the acquisition of marital property.³⁹³ In the four decades since the last of these cases were decided, the scope of these opinions have been limited to the relatively narrow context in which one spouse's employment or other personal services has yielded a "present contingent right subject to divestment."³⁹⁴ These circumstances compelled the court to characterize assets acquired by onerous title—in particular, remuneration for a spouse's personal services—as community property.³⁹⁵ But, if there was a continuum to marital property characterization between onerous and lucrative title, the income earned from a separate property trust would fall towards the latter end of the spectrum, certainly more so than the fruits of a spouse's labor.³⁹⁶

As a matter of public policy, there is one situation in which the present possessory interest rule should not apply – that is, a situation when the

388. See *supra* Part III.C.2 and Part III.C.3.

389. See *supra* Part III.A.2.

390. See *supra* notes 262–264 and accompanying text.

391. See *supra* Part III.A.1 and Part III.A.2.

392. See *id.*

393. See *supra* Part III.A.3.

394. *Taggart v. Taggart*, 552 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. 1977).

395. See *id.*

396. See *supra* Part II.A.6.

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settlor's property rights should take a back seat to the policies of maintaining and protecting community income.³⁹⁷ Specifically, during the marriage, a spouse should not be allowed to establish and fund a trust with her own separate property to unilaterally accomplish what would otherwise require the other spouse's consent under the Texas constitution – the transmutation of community property (income from separate property) into separate property.³⁹⁸ The limited purpose of this exception would be to prevent the settlor spouse from having her cake (changing the character of income from separate property by placing legal ownership within the trust) and eating it too (realizing the benefit of that trust income in the form of distributions). That said, under Texas law, a spouse has the right to gift her separate property—which would include all of the future income from such property—to a third party without the other spouse's consent.³⁹⁹ As such, a rule characterizing *all* trust income from *any* self-settled trust established during marriage as community property would be overbroad, especially in situations where the beneficiary spouse's right to such income is discretionary. Rather, community property characterization should not attach to the trust income until the beneficiary spouse actually receives, or is absolutely entitled to receive, the income of the trust.⁴⁰⁰ In applying this public policy exception to the present possessory right rule, courts could strike a more reasonable balance between the legitimate interests of both spouses by applying the deferred conduit approach (described in the next section) to self-settled trusts established during the marriage.⁴⁰¹

B. The Deferred Conduit Approach

As an alternative that favors a more expansive definition of community property, without completely disregarding the property rights of a trust's settlor, the courts could also adopt a deferred conduit approach, whereby any trust income generated during the marriage would be

397. This public policy exception would be akin to the exception to spendthrift protections for self-settled trusts. *See supra* notes 103–105 and accompanying text.

398. *See supra* notes 302–303 and accompanying text.

399. One commentator has suggested that if the self-settled trust considered in the *Burns* case had been established with separate property with “intent to defraud” the non-beneficiary spouse, then the court could have invalidated the provision in the trust that classified undistributed and accumulated income as principal and declared the income to be community property. LEOPOLD, *supra* note 32, § 6.13, at 173. However, notwithstanding the dicta in that opinion, a claim for fraud on the spouse does not apply to a gift of separate property. *See supra* notes 315–316 and accompanying text.

400. This exception would be consistent with much of the existing case law by limiting the right of non-beneficiary spouse to distributed income. *See* *Lipsey v. Lipsey*, 983 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.); *Lemke v. Lemke*, 929 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied); *In re Marriage of Burns*, 573 S.W.2d 555, 557–58 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1978, writ dismissed); *Shepflin v. Small*, 23 S.W. 432, 433 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1893, no writ).

401. *See infra* Part V.B.

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characterized as community property subject to the following important modifications:⁴⁰²

1. For these purposes, what constitutes community income generated from separate property would be determined under marital property law principles. To allow such determinations to be made by the terms of the trust and the TUIA would provide too much discretion to the settlor and the trustee to manipulate what constitutes principal and income or would tend to result in arbitrary outcomes, thereby defeating the purpose of tipping the balance in favor of reasonably protecting the interests of the non-beneficiary spouse.⁴⁰³

2. The only income that would be considered community property is that income that is both generated by the trust property during the marriage and distributed to the beneficiary spouse during or after the dissolution of the marriage.⁴⁰⁴ Thus, with respect to a trust funded with separate property, all rents, dividends, and interest would be considered potential community income. If necessary, the undistributed balance of community income earned during the marriage could be awarded on a prospective basis – that is, the non-beneficiary spouse would receive a share of each distribution made to the beneficiary spouse after dissolution of the marriage.⁴⁰⁵

3. In characterizing distributions made to the beneficiary spouse, an income-out-first rule would apply in a manner similar to the community-out-first rule applicable to commingled accounts.⁴⁰⁶ Any amount distributed to the beneficiary spouse would be considered a distribution of community income to the extent of the undistributed balance of all community income generated during the marriage immediately prior to the distribution, and the balance of accumulated community income would be computed without regard to the terms of the trust.⁴⁰⁷ This rule would minimize the ability of a trustee to exercise

402. *See supra* Part III.B.

403. *See supra* Part III.C.3.

404. In this respect, this deferred conduit approach could also be described as a variation of the presumptive equity interest theory. *See supra* Part III.B.1.

405. This aspect echoes the approach the courts took in dividing of pension and other benefits that had not yet vested at the time of the order of dissolution. *See supra* Part III.A.3.

406. *See Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dall. v. Wilson*, 279 S.W.2d 650, 659–60 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1995, writ ref'd).

407. For example, terms of the trust providing that undistributed income is to be added to principal annually or granting the trustee the discretion to charge distributions to principal would be disregarded for these purposes. *See supra* Part III.C.3.

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discretion under the terms of the trust for the primary purpose of thwarting the interests of the non-beneficiary spouse.⁴⁰⁸

4. To the extent that the beneficiary spouse has an unfettered right to withdraw an amount from the trust or the trustee has failed to make a mandatory distribution to the beneficiary spouse upon dissolution of the marriage, the court could order the trustee to distribute such amounts to the extent of the non-beneficiary spouse's current interest in the undistributed community income generated during the marriage. Such a rule would prevent the trustee from dragging her heels without any adverse effect to the legitimate interests of the settlor or the other beneficiaries.

To illustrate, suppose that in 2016, a trust was established by a husband's parents during the marriage. The terms of the trust grant the trustee discretion to distribute income or principal as she deems advisable for the health, education, maintenance, or support of the husband and his brother. During the marriage, the trust assets generate investment income; the trustee pays investment management fees; and the trustee makes distributions to both the husband and his brother. However, the husband and wife separate and divorce at the end of 2017. The following illustrates how a deferred conduit approach could be applied before and after the divorce:

	2016	2017	2018
<u>Trust Receipts & Expenditures:</u>			
[1] Interest & dividends:	\$ 200,000	\$ 150,000	\$ 175,000
[2] Net capital gains:	300,000	250,000	275,000
[3] Total receipts (line [1] + line [2]):	500,000	400,000	450,000
[4] Investment management fees:	20,000	16,000	18,000
[4a] Expenditures allocated to interest & dividends (line [1] ÷ line [3] x line [4]):	8,000	6,000	7,000
<u>Distributions to Beneficiaries:</u>			
[5a] To husband:	\$ 150,000	\$ 50,000	\$ 50,000
[5b] To husband's brother:	50,000	50,000	150,000
[5c] Total distributions:	\$ 200,000	\$ 100,000	\$ 200,000

408. *See id.*

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<u>Community Income:</u>				
[6]	Current community income (if married, excess of line [1] over line [4a]):	\$ 192,000	\$ 144,000	N/A
[7]	Prior years' undistributed community income (prior year line [10], if any):	–	–	44,000
[8]	Amount of community income available for distribution (line [6] + line [7]):	\$ 192,000	\$ 144,000	\$ 44,000
[9]	Deemed distribution of community income (lesser of line [5c] or line [8]):	\$ 192,000	\$ 100,000	\$ 44,000
[10]	Ending balance of undistributed community income (line [8] – line [9]):	–	\$ 44,000	–
<u>Character of Distributions to Husband:</u>				
[11]	Community property (line [5a] ÷ line [5c] x line [9]):	\$ 144,000	\$ 50,000	\$ 11,000
[12]	Separate property (line [5a] – line [11]):	6,000	–	39,000
[13]	Total distributions (line [11] + line [12]):	\$ 150,000	\$ 50,000	\$ 50,000

Under the divorce decree, the parties could settle the community claim to the undistributed community income of the trust or the court could order the ex-husband to pay to the ex-wife one-half of such amounts that are ultimately distributed to the ex-husband. For example, in 2018, the ex-husband could be required to pay the ex-wife half of the previously undistributed community property received by the ex-husband (\$5,500).

Although this approach tips the balance in favor of a more expansive definition of community property than the no-greater-interest/present possessory right rule, it is also consistent with the notion, as expressed by certain courts, that the beneficiary is the real owner of the trust property.⁴⁰⁹ Furthermore, the above modifications to the conduit principle would eliminate any need to give special consideration to the identity of the settlor and trustee, the powers of the beneficiary spouse, whether the distributions were mandatory or discretionary, or the settlor's intent.⁴¹⁰

VI. CONCLUSION

The marital property characterization of trust income is unique under Texas law by virtue of the fact that income from separate property is characterized as community property, and there is nothing that the spouse

409. See *supra* note 107 and accompanying text.

410. See *supra* Part IV.A, B, C, E, and G.

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who owns the property can unilaterally do to change that.⁴¹¹ As a result, two critical questions arise: (1) how should the income of a trust funded before the marriage or by a gift or devise be characterized, and (2) what are the relevant circumstances in making such a determination?

Because the applicable law is constitutional, it is generally up to the courts to determine how these issues are resolved; but ever since the Texas Supreme Court made its one and only unequivocal decision in this area over a century ago, the applicable constitutional provisions have changed, the court's own interpretation of those provisions, the contexts for determining these issues, and the breadth of trust provisions and trust investments have changed.⁴¹² The courts have adopted three different approaches—the no-greater-interest/present possessory right rule, the conduit principle, and the equitable interest theory—to address these issues; but none of these approaches are conceptually consistent with the others.⁴¹³ As such, these issues are ripe for consideration by the Texas Supreme Court.

In addition to the inconsistencies, none of these three approaches achieve a sufficient balance between the interests of protecting both the right of a non-beneficiary spouse to community income and every settlor's property right to limit who is and who is not a trust beneficiary.⁴¹⁴ To a certain degree, and in certain circumstances, these interests will inevitably clash. But by making significant modifications to the present possessory right rule or the conduit principle, as proposed in this article, courts could reach a more reasonable, consistent, and coherent balance between each of these competing interests.⁴¹⁵

411. *See supra* Part II.C..

412. *See supra* Part III.A.1.

413. *See supra* Part III.

414. *See supra* Part V.

415. *See id.*

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